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ABSTRACT 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The purpose of this thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to formulate from 
the philosophy of Plato, a coherent theory of a working social 
order. The term "social order" will define the synthesis of 
the state, the laws governing social intercourse, the social 
economy, the religion, the education, and the art. Singl y , 
no one of these activities is sufficient to differentiate 
one society from another, for they too often overlap. Yet , 
a distinction is possible, in which, many times, the observer 
can give no specific criterion except that it is an elusive 
''attitude" or "custom" peculiar to the group. This "attitude'' 
is the common purpose which colors and individualizes the 
activities of the group. 
2. The method of investigation 
The method of investigation used will be an attempt 
to define Plato's doctrine of society through a study of what 
he considered as its origins, its functions, its structure, 
and its purpose. To accomplish this, an integration of the 
historical concept of arete, cultural aim, and of the phil-
osophical principles with the theory will be made. The 
study will center about three dialogue:s, the Republic, the 
Statesman and the Laws. Other dialogues will be used when 
necessary, to add to the development of Plato's thought. 
The Republic is Plato's first formal presentation of an 
educational theory which is to form the base for the re-
formation of Greek society.l In order to indicate the 
principles upon which this theory will operate, he dis~ 
cusses the ethical problems as influences on the vices or 
virtues of a social order. The Republic is a statement of 
how proper education can cure the "ills of society".2 
Later in the Laws, Plato modifies the details of this edu-
cational system, but retains its principles.3 The Statesman 
is Plato's formal statement of a political theory.4 In this 
dialogue is presented the mechanism of the state, that is, 
the structure within which the several factor s of a social 
order operate. Plato defines statesmanship and differen-
tiates this occupation from the other forms of occupation 
which maintain the economy of the social order. The Laws is 
an attempt to realize the unified picture of the total 
structure of the social order. The fact that the Laws s eems 
1. Rep., II. 376 (Cornford ed.). All further references 
~the Republic will be from the Cornford edition un-
less otherwise stated. 
2. Rep., II. 377; III. 401, 412; IV. 420, 421, 422. 
3. Laws, I. 6 43, 644; II . 653 (Jowe tt ed.). All f urther 
references to the Laws and other dialogues, with the 
exception of the Republic will be from the Jowett 
translation, 3rd edition. 
4. Statesman, 259. 
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to contradict the earlier impressions of the Republic and 
the Statesman in many areas, may be the result of Plato's 
attempt to synthesize his several theories of man and society 
into one work. Such a synthesis may have required their 
modification in order to derive an organic unity. It is 
unfortunate that Plato died before this last manuscript 
could have been finally revised. A. E. Taylor feels that 
this lack of revision is responsible for the doubt of its 
authenticity in some quarters.l 
In addition to the study of these dialogues, the 
method includes a comparative study of some other theori es 
of social organization, in the hope of discovering how much 
validity Plato's concept of social order has for contempor-
ary forms. 
3. The work of previous investigations 
Many men faced with the problems of their own 
pe riods have turned to the dialogues of Plato for a h1.nt 
to their solution. The positive influence of such a study 
can be seen in the list of authors on a utopian form of 
society which increased after the publication of Sir 
Thomas More 's Utopia. Some scholars, however, although 
admitting the philosophic insight of Plato 1 have criticized 
his social theories vigorously. The most noteworthy is 
1. Taylor, PMW, 14. 
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R. Crossman in Plato Today . More recent is Poppe r i n 
The Open Society and Its Enemies. Some have defended Plato 
such as Rupert Lodge in Plato's Theory of Education. Worthy 
of notice is J. B. Skemp's introductory chapters to Plato's 
St atesman which seem to present a very understanding per-
spective on Plato's purpose. 
Attention is again brought to Crossman's Plato 
Today for its form of presentation. The author's purpose 
is admired in so far as this is similar to the purpose of 
this thesis. The objections to t his book are (1) that the 
author bases his argument almost exclusively on the Republic 
and (2) the author's reasons explaining why Plato "failed". 
Crossman states that Plato ,justifies the structure of the 
Re public in the axiom that "the connnon man is unreasonable".! 
From this point, he develops his other criticisms of Plato: 
(1) that this is a "bias · in favor of a ristocracy"2 (2) that 
the rule of the philosopher-king denies the fallibility of 
human reason,3 and (3) that human personality is denied. 
1. Crossman, PT, 280. 
2. Crossman, PT, 283. 
3. Crossman PT, 294. ) 
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4. The scope of this thesis 
The position in this thesis will contradict 
Crossman's axiom. Plato's theory is based upon man as a 
creature of reason. True 1 all men do not have full control 
of their capacity for reasoning as "no two people are born 
exactly alike. There are innate differences which fit them 
for different occupations."l However 1 there will be no 
a priori separation into classes. The process of education 
will constitute the test by which each individual himself 
will determine his position. The "one who has come unscathed 
through every test in childhood, youth and ma~~ood ~hall ~ 
Ruler to watch over the commonwealth."2 In addition 1 Plato's 
Myth of the Classes shows that at least the classes would 
not be rigid.3 The council of philosopher-kings is to lead 
by persuasion rather than by force. The art of persuasion 
cannot operate unless the tool of reason is present both 
for the persuaded and the persuader. 
In the development of this thesis, the emphasis 
will not be upon finding reasons for the ineffectualness of 
Plato's theory, but rather that of presenting the spir:tt of 
the theory positively. 
1. ~., II. 369. 
2. Rep.,III. 414. 
3. Rep. 1 III. 414-415. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE CONCEPT OF ARETE 
It was not by accident that Plato emphasized the 
role of education as the basic factor in realizing the ideal 
order of social organ ization. The spiritual history of the 
Greeks can be illuminated by tracing the development of the 
idea of arete. Arete means the aim of the culture of the 
people. In modern thought, a similar meaning is conveyed 
in the concept of a philosophy of education. Werner Jaeger 
has convincingly shown the origin and the consequent broaden-
ing of this concept in the Greek tradition.l The following 
is a concise statement of the development of this concept 
based on the outline of Jaeger's Paideia. 
The concept of arete is important to the study of 
Plato's theory of social organization because it brings to 
light the essential spirit of Greek personality. Each phase 
of the history of Greece is marked by a cultural deviation; 
a deviation brought about by minds interested in finding 
truth wherever it might be, whether in physical things or 
in things of the spirit. The purpose of Greek adventures in 
culture consistently has been to find the satisfying life for 
the individual as a part of the social group. The predecessors 
1. Jaeger , PI GC . 
of Plato left this heritage to him. 
1. The Homeric Period 
Greece of the Homeric Period was engaged in a 
struggle to determj.ne its poll tical supremacy in the Ae gean. 
Naturally, the emphasis would be oh strength and skill in 
battle. Heroic valor, courage and honor were the virtues to 
be inculcated. 
Shall then the Grecians fly? 0 dire disgracet 
And leave unpunished this perfidious race? 
Shall Troy, shall Priam and the adulterous spouse 
In peace enjoy the fruits of broken vows? 
And brave s t chiefs, in Helen's quarrel slain, 
Lie unrevenged on yon detested plain?l 
Yet the outlook was not onesided, for it was geared to more 
than merely physical development. Nobility of mind was the 
complement of action, the aristocratic morality of pride. 
Warriors like you, with strength and wisdom 
bless'd 
By brave examples should confirm the rest.2 
Companion to these was the social sense of duty. The total 
effect, therefore, was a purpose to achieve superiority of 
mind and body. 
The standards for these ideals were derived from 
the structure of Homeric society itself, which was aristo-
cratic. The form of government was monarchic with a literal 
1. Homer, Iliad II. 192-200 (tr. Alexander Pope). 
2. Homer, Iliad II. 227-228 ( t r. Alexander Pope). 
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meaning to the d ivine right of kings, for the king was ruler 
by heredity and claimed direct ancestry from the gods. 
Hence shall thou prove my might, and curse 
the hour 
Thou s tands 't a rival to imperial power; 
And hence to all our host it shall be known 
That kings are subject to the gods alone.l 
He performed the functions of judge, priest and general. 
Ill fits a chief who mighty nations guides 
Directs in council and in wa~ presides 
To whom its safety a whole people owes, 
To waste long nights in indolent repose.2 
Next to the king were the members of his council who claimed, 
equally with him, divine ancestry. The rest of the society 
was made up of the people and slaves, who as mere mortals, 
with no claim to divine ancestry, must be content to be led. 
But if a clamourous vile plebeian rose, 
Him with reproof he check'd or tamed with 
blows. 
Be still thou sla' ve, and to thy betters 
yieldl 
Unknown alike in council and in field13 
The arete for this society, therefore was nobility. 
Education for its achievement was provided through peotry 
and myth which idealized the past actions of heroes. 
1. Homer, Iliad I. 247-250 (tr. Alexander Pope). 
2. Homer, Iliad II. 26-30 (tr. Alexander Pope). 
3. Homer, Iliad II. 235-244 (tr. Alexander Pope). 
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The principle of learning was. imitative. 
The aristocratic structure of the Platonic society 
is indebted to the traditions of this Homeric society. 
2~ The Period of Hesiod 
4 
Hesiod as represented in his pe om "Works and Days", 
shifted the location of arete from the nobility to the 
peasant. Work as a value in itself became the arete. 
Ne i ther doth Famine ever consort with men who 
deal straight judgments, nor Doom; but with 
mirth they tend the works that are their·care.l 
Diligence prospereth work, but the man who 
passeth off ever wrestlethwith ruin.2 
For good husbandry is best for mortal men and 
bad husbandry is worst.3 
By the end of the eig;M~ century, the transition 
from a monarchic form of government to an oligarchic was 
complete. The landed group held full political power. 
Simultaneously with this change was the development of trade 
routes resulting in subsequent colonization. 4 
As trading became increasingly important, a new 
class arose. These were the men who invested in the new 
ent erprise. Their prestige was based on money rather 
1. Hesiod, "Works and Days", in Botsford and Sihler ( ed.), 
HC, 179. 
2. Botsford and Sihler (ed.), HC, 180. 
3. Botsford and Sihler (ed.), HC, 181. 
4. Enc. Brit., Vol. 10, 762. 
than on lineage or property. As their power grew, they 
edged the aristocrats. However, in order to gain control, 
they sought alignment with the discontented peasants. Thus 
with their finances and the power of the number of the peasant 
class, the aristocracy fo1md itself on the defensive. The 
new class was the champion of the underdog.l The way was 
being paved for the tyranny of the seventh and sixth centuries. 
However, the peasants, although being free from the aristo-
cratic regime, were becoming more miserable. For now, in- · 
stead of a griculture for the supply of' food to the populace, 
there .was cultivation of vineyards and olive groves for the 
merchandising of overseas commerce. The problem of justice 
came to the fore ground. Thus Hesiod again spoke for the 
peasant class. The i deal of justice asserted itself as a 
guiding principle. 
For the Immortals are nigh : among men and 
remark them that with crooked judgments 
oppress one another, taking no heed of the 
anger of the gods.· •• Also there is the 
maiden Justice ••• and whenever one injureth 
her with crooked reviling ••• she ••• telleth 
of the unrighteous mind of men, till the 
people pay for the folly of their kings.2 
Poetry continued to be the medium of reaching · 
people. Hesiod's "Works and Days" was an example of the new 
content of the poems which expressed the problems of the 
1. Enc. Brit., Vol. 10, 778. 
2. Botsford and Sihler (ed.), HC, 179-180. 
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toiling class, rather than extolling the prowess of the 
nobility. The choice of myths changed accordingly. The 
myth of the five races of mankind by Hesiod showed the 
changes of society from the aristocracy, which claimed 
descent from the gods, through to the discontent of his own 
period. l His aim must have been the development of awareness 
in the individual of the causes of social difficulty, along 
with proposed solutions for the removal of these causes. 
Arete, therefore, was not to be acquired merely 
by imitation of the heroic deeds of the warriors of a past 
age, but rather through reason and understanding. 
This concern with justice and this emphasis on 
reason is to reappear in the Platonic works. 
3. The Spartan State 
By the middle of the sixth century Sparta had 
established itself ~s the sole military giant of t he Greek 
world.2 This supremacy was the result of a ti ght internal 
policy based upon the theory that the individual was sub-
ordinate to the state. Protection of the state from invasion 
became the chief aim of its citizens. 
1. Botsford and Sihler (ed.), HC, 176-178. 
2. Enc . Brit., Vol. 21, 170-171. 
6 
In Sparta, therefore, civic education developed. 
Training for military service began in childhood. The con-
ditions, supervised by the state, were desi gne d to develop 
toughness, obedience, and military efficiency. Xenophon 
related his first-hand experience of the Spartan system. 
I first noted the unique position of Sparta 
amongst the states of Hellas, the rela t ively 
sparse population and a't the same time, the 
extraordinary power and prestige of the 
c.ommuni ty .1 
It §ndermeny is transferred to the legis-
lator iPYcurguj? who gave them those laws, 
obedience to which has been the secret of 
their prosperity.2 
The training of the body as incumbent no less 
on the female than the male ; and in pursuit 
of the same idea instituted rival contests for 
running and tests of strength for women as 
well as for men.3 
Instead of leaving it to each member of the 
state privately to appoint a slave to be his 
son's escort, he set over the young Spartans 
a public guardian ••• with complete authority 
over them.4 
In fact, the very privilege of citizenship depended upon the 
successful attainment of the rigorous goals set by the state. 
It was not until the age of thirty that the true rights and 
1. Xenophon, Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, in Botsford 
and Sihler ( ed.), HC, 131. .._ 
2. Botsford and Sihler (ed.), HC, 131. 
3. Botsford and Sihler (ed.), HC, 132. 
4. Botsford and Sihler (ed.), HC, 133. 
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duties of citizenship began. Then, this also depended upon 
the f ulfillment of three conditions which were (1) birth, 
(2) training according to the laws, and (3) membership in 
one of the dining messes.l 
To further free the ci tizen for service to the 
state, it was illegal for Spartans to participate in trade 
or manufacture, and to have either go ld or silver.2 
Thus the Spartan education was the outgrowth of 
an oligarchic political structure. Its arete was patriotism. 
Glory and exaltation of the polis above the individual were 
the contents of the cultural aim. Again the means was 
through poetry, but instead of praising the heroism of person-
ality, the heroism of the citizen as patriot was sung . "To 
die for one's country is a hero's death",3 and obedience to 
the dictates of the state was the ideal. 
Without a doubt, Plato was influenced ~y the social 
structure of the Spartan state, and perhaps admired its dis-
ciplined order. He certainly was well acquainted with the 
conditions and the constitution4 of Sparta as evidenced in 
t h e long discussion in the Laws, Book I, of the positive and 
1. Enc. Brit., Vol. 21, 171. 
2. Enc. Brit., Vol. 21, 171. Cf. Rep. IV. 419. 
-
3. ,Jaeger, PIGC, 87. 
4. Re£., VII I . 544 
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negative points of tlus social form. Both the Republic and 
the Laws accept the equality accorded women, the emphasis 
upon gymnastics, the control of education from birth by the 
state, and the institution of common meals.l However, Plato 
criticized the military state and the lack of sufficient 
concern for the things of the spirit--music, literature, 
and the like.2 
4. The Sophists 
With the city-state of the fifth century and its 
new democratic structure, protagonists of a different arete 
arose. The paideia of previous periods was a means to the 
attainment of arete. (Paideia is the conscious striving for 
set values. ' It is the educational system within a cultural 
structure, which is organized to preserve and transmit an 
ideal physical and intellectual character. It is the effort 
to establish a pattern that will permeate the life of each 
individual member of the cultural group.)3 Education now be-
came an end in itself and lost tl1e equivalence to culture in 
its broader meanings. Education and arete became one. This 
new arete was knowledge , political knowledge, and its expon-
ents were the Sophists. 
1. Rep., V. 452; II. 377; III. 403, 416; Laws, VI. 762, 781; 
VII. 804. 
2. Rep., III. 401; VIII. 544-545;. Laws, I. 629-630. 
3. Jaeger, PIGC, xiii, xvi, xviii. 
9 
By the beginning of the fifth century, the phil-
osophies of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Zeno had been pushed 
to their logical conclusions. Ske pticism followed in the 
wake of the theories of flux and the incompatibility of t he 
one and the many. The leading Sophists derived their positions 
from the futility of reconciling these theories with the 
problem of knowing . Protagoras concluded · that knowl·edge is 
relative and that only opinion is constant; therefore power 
rested in strength. His premise was that "Man is the measure 
of all things, of what is, that it is, and of what is not, 
that is not."l Gorgias held that knowledge was impossible 
for "nothing exists; ••• if anything did exist we could never 
know it; ••• if perchance a man should come to know it, it 
would remain a secret, he would be unable to describe it to 
hi s fellow-raen."2 Thus power rested in the · excellence of 
oratory. Prodicus with his emphasis on grammar and practical 
ethics, placed power in the ability to use syntax. Hippias, 
the most learned, advocated the liberal education for itself. 
In general, the refore, the sophists , unhappy with the irre-
solution of the early philosophi es, made the preparation for 
civic lif e important. For nearly one hundred years, they 
held the monopoly of liberal education.3 
1. Bakewell, SBAP, 67. 
2. Bakewell, SBAP, 67. 
3. Enc. Brit., Vol. 20, 999. 
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In the democratic social order of the period, each 
citizen had an important role in the governing policy of the 
state. Political techne (art as skill) became a necessity. 
Eloquence was the virtue to be developed. Intellectual 
power and ability as an orator were imperative. Unf_ortunately, 
there was no common cultural aim such as unified the earlier 
periods. Man as the measure determined his individual goals~ 
and various principles of what constituted knowledge existed 
together. This is exemplified in the Sophists themselves. 
With no educational ideal~ the sy stem deteriorated 
into a shallow dilettantism. The criterion of knowledge 
wa s based on the power of persuasion through style, rhetoric 
and the ability to outpoint the opposition in debate. Truth 
was subordinate to semantics. 
Plato was disturbed by this empty concept of arete. 
His wish was to find an intelligible principle of value which 
would give content and universality to the Hellenic point of 
view. The result of the fifth-century emphasis upon the 
isolated individual caused him to seek this all-inclusive 
principle in man as a social animal. The Platonic arete, 
therefore, would be a socially oriented concept. 
11 
CHAPTER II 
THE ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
1. The Possibility of Social Control 
All theories of social organization are based on 
the assumption that social control is possib~e. However, 
the difficulty lies with the means of achieving it. The 
fai lure of the methods employed so far to set up the proper 
conditions, has resulted in the belief, that maybe ideal 
social relations are unattainable, and that any attempt to 
confine the activities of the group is harmful, because 
such a move creates artificial conditions which deter the 
natural progress of society. Yet an approximation to these 
ideal relations, it must be admitted, is most desirable. 
Stephen Pepper makes this statement on the condi-
tions of social control: 
Pessimism regarding social prediction and 
control is not seriously a denial of its 
occurrence, but disappointment over its 
extent.l 
Pepper defines predict ion as a statement about future events 
as based on evidence; control as the application of pre-
dictions to the attainment of human purpose.2 
1. Pepper, Art.(l942), 29. 
2. Pepper, Art.(l942), 30. 
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According to Pepper; this prediction must be 
accomplished at three levels; the level of science, the 
level of psychology and the level of the social and ethical. 
Unless there i s control at level three, activities at the 
levels of the first two items are useless. 
Pepper's position is admirable, for the ethical 
aspect of society is too frequently ignored in the race to 
con trol science and. psychology. However, to say that 
a ctivities occurring on the level of natural science are 
wasted unless they have reve rberat ions in the ethical life 
of a social order is to reduce each phase of a society to 
ethics. No one phase can absorb the other phases. They 
must co-exist in harmony. The aim should be to control 
their development so that no phase advances too far beyond 
the other and t hus produces a lag. 
Pepper presents three "theories" of . social control:l 
(1) The · functional which can be either resultant 
or emergent is the mechanistic view that social 
behaviorism is to be controlled through in-
dividual behavior. 
(2) Social determinism which is a theory of 
distinct social laws independent of human 
behavior. 
(:3) The exhortational view which has ethical 
ideals as the goal and uses the method of 
persuasion .. 
He dismisses the exhortational theory for the 
1. Pepper, Art.(l942), 3lff. 
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reason that it implies a bifurcation between the empirical 
world and the ideals. Therefore an empirical theory of social 
control denies the reality of ideals. "Thus" he continues, 
"either the Exhortational Theory boils down to propa ganda 
whi ch is injurious enough", or it is in search of empirical 
social laws.l 
Pepper admitted the possibility of social control. 
Another writer, Popper, in the Open Society and Its Enemies, 
Vol. I, exhibits the pess.imism .of which Pepper accuses some. 
His bo ok is against all social philosophies which raise 
the c laims . of a discovery of laws of history which enable 
them to prophesy the course of historical events.2 This 
type of theory he labels "historicism". He calls such theories 
reactionary movements which have tried and are trying to up-
set civilization and regress to tribalism.3 Heraclitus, 
Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx are lumped together. The 
manifestations of historicism are in theories which have a 
(1) doctrine of chosen people, (2) law of nature, (3) law of 
spiritual development, and (4) law of economic development. 
In place of such social theories, Popper would 
substi tute a scientific study of social institutions and 
their workings. He would :tntroduce gradua l reforms in 
1. Pepper, Art.(l942), 34. 
2. Popper, OSE, 3. 
3. Popper, OSE, 1. 
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schools 1 legal systems 1 forms of government and penal in-
stitutions. This piecemeal planning (social engineering) 
through the study of individual institutions 1 is possible 
and leads to social progress. Large scale planning (histor-
icism) is impossible and Utopian and leads to disillusion 
and disorder. 
An adequate rebuttal to Popper is made by Mardiros. 
If the personal factor makes large scale plan-
ning impossible, it must make piecemeal planning 
impossible too.l 
At any given stage in history man is faced 
with certain alternative futures and that 
he has a choice between these alternatives. 
A rational choice between them will in-
volve the taking of large scale action to 
shape the future in accordance with the 
best of these alternatives. A refusal to 
choose 1 or a choice of actions inadequate 
to the occasion will result in the loss of 
human freedom.2 
Peppe r claims that all social theories stated in 
terms of Platonic forms are varieties of the theory of 
social determinism.3 This position seems to ignore Plato's 
emphasis upon the supremacy of the law of reason in man 1 
and the principle of persuasion a s presented in the Timaeus. 
The social order as posited by Plato i s more like ly 
of the exhortational view. The ethical i deals are inspired 
by t he philosopher-kings and become the goals of the whole 
1. 
2. 
'Z 
'-'• 
Mardiros, Art.(l948), 344. 
Mardiros 1 Art.(1948), 349. 
Pepper, Art.(l942), 83. 
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society, through its members, by the power of persuasion in 
the philosopher-king. To say that Plato admits of social 
laws independent of hu.'1lan behavior is to confuse the source 
with its tributaries. 
Plato believed firmly in the validity of social con-
trol. His method would be an extensive and intensive edu-
cation from birth through adulthood. For those who are al-
ready matured, he would use the method of persuasion as the 
only type of control suitable to a mind.l His concern was 
not very much with the products of the old or-der, but rather 
with the coming generation, which pliable in youth, would 
be molded in accord with justice through reason for effi-
cient functioning in the social order. 
In training the members of the social order, one 
has to decide firs t, what kind of city constitutes his ideal, 
and then proceed to construct social and educational insti-
tutions such as are required by that ideal. Plato constructs 
t he ideal city of the Republic and the model city of the 
Laws (in which he considers the human conditions under which 
hi s ideal is realizable). 
The exposition in the Republic deals primarily with 
the dynamic elements of the social order. It is concerned 
with the difficult job of defining the principles which are 
1. Laws, IV. 718, 723. 
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t he spirit, the arteries of a society. The problems which 
must be met in all theories of social order are: What is t he 
origin and nature of the state? What is justice? What is 
the good life? ·What relationship among the members of a 
social order will allow the maximum approximation in attain-
ing the happiness of all? Vfhat institutions must exist to 
provide a suitable environment for the achievement of the 
goals of the social order? 
The Laws gives the proposed state specific and 
practical treatment. It is concerne d with the machinery of 
the social order. The result is a greatly modified version 
of that which 1 s presented in the Republ ic·. 'Much of the 
idealism that expressed faith in the positive side of human 
nature gives way to a pronounced pessimism. In the Republic, 
reason is the guide to action, whereas in the Laws, the 
codified principles are second only to the deity. The former 
is a social philosophy; the latter, a treatise on the state. 
2. The Psychological Principles 
To understand a certain society and its form of 
organization, it is profitable to become acquainted first 
with the theory of man upon which it is based .. 
Man is a rational being. In Plato's theory this 
is the factor in man which sets him apart from other living 
beings . ia b~e vea~.l When he is aware of this distinction 
1'7 
and lives in accord with his rational principle , he functions 
as man in his highest capacity, which is, sharing in the 
immortality of divine· things.l Mere possession of the faculty 
f or reason is not suffieient. It must be exercised constantly 
in order to develop fully.2 
Man is a moral creature. His reason, the instru-
ment of personal freedom, permits him to choose from al-
te rnative courses of a ction. In addition to reason, man has 
will (the "spirited element"), and desires (the 11 appetitest').3 
When reason controls the will and selects the desires which 
ma y be manifested without harmful effects the life of the 
individual is virtuous. Each part of his nature is function-
ing at its proper level in its right proportions.4 This 
differentiation of the .functions of the three aspects of 
man's nature results in the attainment of the virtue of 
justice. When the "spirited element" is in true function, 
the virtue is courage ; when reason rules and guides the 
other parts, the virtue is wisdom; when there is harmony 
within the total nature, the virtue is temperance.5 
1. Timaeus, 89. 
2. Timaeus, 89; Rep., IV. 441. 
3. Rep., IV. 440. 
4. Rep., IV. 442. 
5. Rep., IV. 441. 
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Man is a social animal. There is an interde-
pendence of rational beings produced by the fact that each 
individual comes into existence endowed with unique .abilities.l 
Each person fulfills his own nature only by developing and 
using t hese abilities in his particular place in the social 
order. This is the road to perfect virtue and happiness. 
The type of social order must be so organized 
tha t man can realize his nature. The reform of society must 
begin at the top, among the rulers, and reach down to the 
lower orders of society. If the rulers are educated to 
know the principles of reality and their own nature and the 
nature of their subjects, the state will be well-ordered 
and the need for legi slation and retributive laws will be 
a t a minimum. In the perfect state, all the groups wi ll 
function in complete harmony. The just state does not 
seek to secure the happines s of any one class but to secure 
"the greatest possible happiness" f or the society as a whole. 
3. The Role of Vocation 
The principles by which the vocations of the 
members of the social order are determi ned are the reasons 
for the origin of the state.2 Man is of necessity a social 
1. Rep., II, 368, 369, 374; III. 394. 
2. Rep., II. 368. 
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animal. Each individual has innate differences and he has 
nee ds .l These innate differences limit his capacity to 
satisfy all his needs. It is only in the exchang e of social 
intercourse that the proper fulfillment of these needs is 
poss ible. In the pooling of special abilities, all are 
able to pursue an aptitude for the sake of efficiency. 
The best social order, therefore, is one which 
rec ognizes the differences among men, and provides for the 
proper division of their labor as they contribute to the 
maintenance of the group. 
This is the pattern of the Platonic order. There 
are to be specialized training programs to suit the several 
member groups of the social order. 
He who would be good at anything must 
practice that thing from his youth up-
wards, b oth in sport and earnest, in the 
particular way which the work requires.2 
He who is to secure and prese rve the 
public order of the state, has an art 
which requires much study and many kinds 
of knowledge, and does not admit of 
being made a secondary occupation.3 
The occupations grou ped hierarchically from that 
needing the most intensive training at the level of dialectics 
to tha t of manual skill are (1) Ruling , (2) Executive, (3) 
1. ~., II. 369. 
2. ~~ I. 643. 
3. Laws, VIII. 846. 
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Mil i tary, (4) Professional, (5) Handicraft and Trading and 
(6) Fa rming. The duties of the rulers and the executives 
are de liberation, supervision, and direction. They perform 
the following activities:l 
1. Deliberate in councils upon policies. 
2. Decide upon the church calendar dates of court-
of-justice sessions, dates of peacetime military 
sports meet. 
3. Initiate and revise laws as occasion arises. 
4. Scrutinize the qualities of magistrates and 
supervise their conduct in office. 
5. Supervise the behavior of citizens in home, 
street, temples, in peace, and in war. 
6. Appoint visitors to travel and observe forei gn 
institut ions and report back, with suggestions 
for the improvement of the home institutions. 
7. Sit in all important administrative positions 
and (after 60 years of age) to all important 
representative positions. 
Ci ti zens of the s t ate are limited to the occupations 
of' husbandry, shepherds and bee-keepers, and to the superior-
tending of the implements used in these. 2 Only the metics 
(fore i gners within the state) may practice the occupation of 
1. Laws, VI. 758-768; Rep., IV. 424-425. 
2. Laws , VIII. 842. 
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handicraft arts.l To the metics also are left the business 
of trading and retail merchandising.2 Even these non-citi-
zens are confined to pursuing and managing one craft and no 
more, upon the principle that the individual can attain ex-
cellence in only one occupation, and that, the one for which 
he is naturally endowed. 
Technical education for the professions is on two 
levels. The lower phase is concrete, practical and depend-
ent upon association and practice rather than upon insight. 
The h igher phase rests partly upon experience and training, 
but requires for its full development, the insight which 
comes from the serious systematic study of philosophy.3 
This means that there are two positions to be filled in ~ach 
profession, the master and the assistant. ·The master accom-
plishes his end through persuasion for he understands the 
essen ces of the situations which develop in his profession. 
On the other hand, the assistant can only use dogmatism for 
his knowledge comes from imitating the master and from 
personal experience.4 However, both phases are necessary to 
the at tainment of the ends of the professions in order to 
insure efficient service to the community, for the method 
1. Laws, VIIIe 846. 
2. Laws, VIII. 842; 849. 
3. Rep., III, 408-409. 
4. Laws, IV, 720. 
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must s u i t the clients.l 
The medical profession ensures the continuation 
of phys ical health. Its duty is not to prolong the life 
of t he invalid but rather the life of those already in good 
healt h.2 The legal profession ensures moral and political 
well-b eing. It requires a wide experience of men and 
affai rs, thorough training in the habits of law and phil-
osophi c insight into the ideal principle of value.3 The 
educa t or directs music and qymnastics and judges the contests 
in t h ese fields. The ministry of education is the hi ghest 
office of the state.4 The theological profession interprets 
the prophecies and the poets.5 The military profession is 
c once r ned with the protection of the community in case of 
war, t he making of roads, the care of fountains and streams, 
irriga t ion and is required to have exact knowledge of the 
geogr aphy and topog raphy of the locality. It also decides 
the issues on minor cases.6 These professions are positions 
for the auxiliaries (also known as guardians or wardens) 
who make up the second cJa ss of the social order. 
1. Laws, IV, 721-722. 
2. Rep., III, 410. 
3. Laws, VI. 770; XII. 964. 
4. Laws, VI. 764, 766. 
5. Laws, VI. 769. 
6. Laws, VI. 760. 
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4~ The Fami l y 
The best state maintains justice in ratio to the 
ordering of its parts. Revision of the structures of the 
voc~tional life and t he educational instltutions is in-
eff ctual unl ess a correlat ive revision is made in the 
social unit known as the family. This is a principle of 
an organl c social theory. 
The ideal f ami l y unit for Plato as expressed in 
the Republic is the state in which all its members are uni -
fied by a common share in all i ts pleasures and ~ains. This 
unity of emotion can be trul y atta.ined only if the possessive 
adjectives 6f "mine " and " yours" are eliminated from the 
vocabulary .l Any oth er unit l ess than perfect. 
However , recognition of the difficulty in obta in-
ing this condition until man is thoroughly educated, forced 
Pla to to d elineate a s e cond best order as in the Repub ic2 
and a third best order as found in the Laws.3 An important 
di ffe r ence comes up between the two dialo~ues because of 
th s distinct ion. 
1. Rep., V. 461, Laws, V. 739. 
2. Rep., V. 457. 
3. Laws , VI. 772. 
In the Republic, the communal life, with wives 
and children in common, is advocated for the rulers and 
execut ives to insure the maintainance of their highly moral 
character.l With the removal of private property comes 
the eliminat ion of private interests as a danger to the 
public interest. There is no cause for distraction in the 
duty of ministering to the greatest good for the whole 
social order, and the rulers are free from the pressure 
power arising from the concerns associated with family ties.2 
When t his is combined with the strict control of the mating 
process to secure the fittest type of offspring, the result 
is a high ratio of probability that superior individuals 
will e volve. The aim is to unite persons of equal abilities 
and stations with like personalities mating.3 
The institution of certain festivals is the in-
strument by which brides and bridegrooms are introduced.4 
Although the combination of the couples is decided before-
hand by the rulers, an illusion of free choice is enacted 
through the ceremony of the drawing of lots (prearranged to 
1. Rep., v. 457. 
2. Rep., v. 463-464. 
3. Rep., v. 459. 
4. Rep., v. 459. 
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coincide with the above mentioned decision) by the parti-
cipants. This deception is necessary to avoid dissatis-
faction, for then, the "inferior candidate may blame his 
luck rat her than the rulers."l 
The better children from this union will be taken 
t o the public nurseries where their education in the good 
life i s to begin, while the others (inferior and defect i ve) 
nwill be hidden away, in some appropriate manner that must 
be kept secret 1'.2 All children conceived at the same festival 
are to be considered brothers and si~ters and are to have 
the same parents in common. This is a precaution against 
incestu ous unions. 
In the Laws, marriage regulations are modified 
greatly . Monogamous marriage is advocated for all members 
of the social order, with the privilege of choosing one's 
mates.3 This modification is possible because the equal 
distribution of all properties and facilities is relevant 
to eve ryone rather than to only the ruling class as in the 
Republic.4 However, the advice of the state is tnat unlike 
personalities and classes should marry (rich and poor, wise 
with t he less wise, and the like). This suggestion is made 
1. Rep ., v. 460, 459. 
2. Rep., v. 460. Cornford notes that the implied infanticide 
would concern only the defective, the inferior being rele-
gated to the lowest class. ROP, 160. 
3. Laws, VI. 772. 
4. Laws, VI. 740. 
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with the well-being of the state in mind, for a series of 
marriag es in which like with like are united, would result 
in an i n equality in the distribution of property and in 
the unba lance of the dispositions of the citizens.l However, 
this is simply an advice and should not be made compulsory 
by wri t ten law.2 This position opp oses the static na ture of 
the idea l Republic to the vigorous nature of the practical 
state of the Laws. 
Another modification concerning marriage is that 
in the Laws , the festivals for the betrothals are managed 
by the i~mediate families of those to be mated. The state 
mainta ins only that they be moderate and in keeping with 
the means of the families. 3 As in the Republic, prospective 
wives a nd husbands me e t at the choric festivals which they 
attend i n the nude, the b et ter that the physical graces ma y 
be s e en be f ore the contract is filled. 
In both dialogues, marria ge as the union of the 
sexes i n the ro l e of progenitors, is properly the admin-
istration of the state. It is a public f unction and a duty, 
and as such must be under constant supervision for the first 
1. Laws, VI. 773. 
2. Laws, VI. 773. 
3. Laws, V. 775. 
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ten years. To have children is an obligation, therefore any 
union which remains sterile for that period is dissolved. 1 
Privilege s and honors are extended to pa~ents to encourage 
child-bear) ng, while taxes are imposed on any male remaining 
a bachelor over the age of thirty-five. Widows and widowers 
who have insufficient number of children are obligated to 
(") 
remarry .t- This reform of the institution of marriage is 
essential for moral and eugenic reasons, which if ignored, 
result i n dissonance in the harmony of the well-ordered state.3 
The specific concern with planned parenthood is 
the at tempt to maintain constant, the number of citizens.4 
In the Laws, the provision which circumscribes the number 
of cit izens to 5040 also limits the number .of families.5 
In the case of the death of the male bead of tbe family, 
inheritance is passed on to a son.6 Other sons are a_:dopted 
into the families of other citizens, and the daughters of 
the deceased are married orr.? · If the widow is young enough 
1. Laws ·~ VI!" '784. 
2. Laws , VI. 774. 
3. Rep., v. 457. 
4. Rep., v. 459. 
5. Laws , VI. 771. 
6. Laws, XI. 923 .. 
7. Laws , XT. 92~, 924• 
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to have yet the desire for male companionship, or if older 
and still able to produce, but without children by the pre-
vious marriage, she is duty-bound to marry a ga in.l This 
dissolution of the family when it ceases to be harmonious 
with the we ll-being of the state is characteristic of the 
principle basic to all institutions in the Platonic social 
order. 
Although Plato surrenders his ideal of marriage 
in the Republic to the practical form as described in the 
Laws, he retains the unbending morality tnat must exist 
between the sexes. Citizens should at least be able to be 
as cont inent as "birds and beasts in general, who are born 
in gree.t multi tudes, and remain until the age of procreation 
virgin and unmarried." 2 Illicit love and adultery are 
punishable by deprivation of civic hono~s:; and privileges.3 
Pl ato, however , is aware that human nature is 
generally weak in relation to the emotional life. He 
recognize s that legal measures alone are not sufficient to 
prevent the · m.isuse of love. Thus he proposes additional 
means t hrough which the citizens may achieve a wholesome 
and holy sex life. These are means based 9n the principle 
1. Laws, XI. 930. 
2. Laws, VII. 840. 
3. Laws, VIII. 841. 
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of pie t y , the love of honor, and the desire of beauty in 
the soul.l The legislators shall consecrate the union of 
the sexes, thereby establishing the power of tradition which 
few would dare to flaunt.2 In addition, the citizens must 
occupy themse lves with work to divert their energies into 
other c hannels.3 An unwritten law must be sanctioned that 
concealment of any violation, although not desirable, is 
honorable and that open vice is di shonorable.4 
The social relationship among members of a family 
is one of obedience, honor, and respect.5 The younger is 
subject to t he elder, the wife to the husbapd, and the 
child t o the parent. Aged parents are to be honored, for 
the gods have a special reception to their prayers.6 Any 
neglect and ill-treatment of t hese parents are punishable by 
law. Off enders under fort y years will receive "st ripes and 
bonds", a nd those over forty will be brought before a court 
1. Laws, VIII. 841. 
2. Laws, VI II . 838. 
3. Law s , VI II . 841. 
4. ~~ VIII. 841. 
5. Laws, v. 729. 
6. Law s, XI. 931. 
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of all the eldest citizens who will judge and impose both 
fine and punishment to any degree.l 
Instruction in the care and education of children 
is developed in detail. The youth are important in the 
Platoni c society because it is they who will eventually 
realize t he ideal social order. They will not have been 
handicapped by the practices and traditions of the institu-
tions o f the past order which so mucb hinder their elders. 
Indoctrinat ion into the new forms of the state will be pain-
less, f o r youth is pliable.2 
Plato's provisions for 'the care of the child prove 
his insight in the area of child-psychology. His list com-
pares f avorably with the principles which today's parents 
find expressed in the writings of Ilg, Gesell, Ames and 
Spock. The pregnant women must find exercise by walking 
about.3 After birth, the infant's psychological needs 
must be met. These are: the need for movement and cutaneous 
stimulation, the soothing effect of rhythm, the p~~tection 
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from disturbing fears during early childhood to avoid crush-
ing the spirit, the provision of quiet and adequate amusement.4 
1. Laws, XI. 932. 
2. Laws, II, 663; VII. 788. 
3. Laws, VII. 789. 
4. Laws, VII. 790-792. 
Plato voices his opi ni on that the first three 
years of l ife are the most important since they are the most 
impre ssionable~l If the social order is to have adults whose 
souls ar•e ngent le and cheerful" rather than " discontented 
and ungr·acious", it is necessar;r tha t the critical period of 
e&rly childhood be free from unnecessary sorrow, fear and 
pain. 
In b oth the Republic and the Laws, slave-nurses 
carry t1e burden of the heavy and exhausting work associated 
with the early years of child-care. From the age of three 
onward the state a ssu_mes the education of the child. 
Plato denies that the place of woman is necessarily 
the home.2 As seen in the Republic, the woman is freed from 
t he responsibilities t hat are pertinent to the situation of 
t h e priva te home-maker . 3 The communal life literally sets 
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her free to participate in public activities. In the Laws, 
woman is partially restricted until her children no long er 
n ee d her supervision. However, the institution of slaves re -
l ieves the private wife of the drudgery of heavy house duties . 
The nature of woman is the same as that of man for 
she is b orn with natural endowments just as man is.4 Therefore, 
1.. Laws, VII. 792. 
2. Re;e., v. 455. 
3. Rep., v. 460. 
4. Rep., v. 455. 
after re ce iving equal education, there is no natural reason 
(i.e. according to nature) ~hich prohibits her participation 
in publi c life. Plato uses "nature·" in the sense of having 
capacity to perform duties, rather than in the meaning of 
the subj ective self.l In fact, he would say that, in the 
latter s ense, the nature of woman is inferior to that of 
man in pos ses sion of virtue.2 
Nevertheless, for the welfare of the whole social 
order, the activities of women must be regulated in the same 
manner a s that of men. To neglect the role of women is as 
much as neglecting one-half of the state.3 Therefore, with 
natural gifts for all occupations being in both sexes, women 
must be tra ine d for their part in the management of social 
duties. 
In the Republic, which develops the training of the 
Guardians, women share the life and duties of this class. In 
the Laws, the duties of women in legislature are concerned 
with the guidance of procreation, birth, and early education.4 
As "controllers of marriage", they are 1) to see that the 
marriage laws are obeyed, and to bring and press charges 
where necessary, 2) to supervise pre-school training of 
1. Rep., v. 454. 
2. Rep., v. 453; Laws, VI. 781. 
3,; ~~ VI. 781. 
1 
4. Laws, VI. 784, 794. 
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children with right of appeal to polic·e authorities to enforce 
their directions, 3) to assist in settling disputes between 
husband and wife, 4) to maintain the biological and biosocial 
continuity of the community. 
Even here, Plato remains true to his principles 
that the i ndividual must fulfill his capacity through the 
group. Although women are broadly given an equal opportunity 
in educat ion and in office holding, their role is gteared to 
their peculiar function as the principal factor in the propa-
gation of the race. Woman is emancipated but not transformed. 
She is e qual as a rational creature but specialized by the 
nature of her funct ion as mother. 
One note of complete accord stands out in the dis-
.cussion of family life · in both the earlier and the later 
dialogues, and that is the institution of eating meals in 
community halls .l This is the natural corollary of the 
fundament a l pr inciple of a social mean s of production. 
Plato expresses regret that the institution of 
common meals is only a "second-best form of policy", the 
ideal being the abolition of private property in all forms -
houses, women and children.2 
1. Rep., v. 458; Laws, VI. 781 
2. Laws, VII. 807. 
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5. The Epistemological Basis 
The core of Plato's epistemology is the theory of 
anamnes is which states that knowledge is acquired, not 
through the senses or as information convey ed from one mind 
to anothe r, as in teaching, but by recollection in this li f e, 
of r ealitie s and truths seen and known by the soul before 
its incarnation. This position does not deny the part of 
sensory experience in the knowing process, but rather re·le-
gates sense data to their proper place. 
It is through the senses that we mus t learn 
that all sensible objects strive after ab-
solute equality and fall short of it .l 
If we are ever to know anything ab so lutely , 
we must be free from the body and must be-
hold the actua l realities wi th the eye of 
the soul a lone.2 
Two basic doctrines a r e evident, 1) the immortality 
and divini ty of the r a tional soul and 2) the real existence 
of the object s of knowledge in a realm distinct from tha t of 
sense; hence an epistemological dualism. 
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The two orders of things are the realm of the unseen 
and the re a lm of the seen. In the realm of the unseen , the 
objects are simple, unchanging and eternal, whereas t he ob-
jects of the reaL~ of the seen are complex, changing a nd 
temporal. 
1. Phaedo, ?5. 
2. Phaedo, 99. 
Both of these realms are within experience and as 
such have c or•responding levels of knowinga There is know-
ledge and the re is opinion.l Then there are the objects of 
knowledge, t h ose of opinion, and the states of mind which 
apprehend t he se objects.2 In the Repubiic, Plato introduce s 
the principle of the Line to explain the progressive structure 
of the nature of knowing. 
There are two main parts to the Line - the intell-
igible orde i· and the visible order.3 The objects of know-
ledge in t h e intelligible order are mathematics, Forms and 
the Good.4 The corresponding states of mind for mathematics 
and Forms are thinldng and dialectic.5 The object~;~ in the 
visible orde r are images and things, and the corresponding 
states of mi nd are conjecture arid belief.6 Al~ objects ex-
cept the Good have corresponding states of mind.? This means 
that the Good cannot be known merely through the regular 
1. Rep., v. 4?6. 
2. ~., v. 4'7?, 4?8. 
3. Rep., VI. 509. 
4. Rep., VI. 509, 510; VII. 51'7. 
5. Rep., VI. 511 .. 
6. Rep., VI. 509, 511. 
?. Rep., VII. 518; VI. 508. 
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development of mental ability, but is grasped by spiritual 
intuition which transcends the general means of attaining 
knowledge.l However, it is necessary for the mind to 
function a t all stages before the intuitive spark can develop 
to bridge t he gap between the Forms and their ultimate source, 
the Good.2 In t he Allegory of the Cave, Plato illustrates 
the gradual development requisite to knowledge of the Good, 
just as seeing the sun takes a gradual adjustment of the 
eyes to the intensity of sunlight.3 
The objective of the individual should be knowledge 
rather than mere opinion, for knowledge is concerned only 
with reali ty , wh i le the objects of opinion lie between the 
extremes of rea lity and unreality.4 The objects of opinion 
have this inde te rminate position because of their complexity 
and relative value as things in the visible world.5 
'r he Good is the ultimate source of reality and of 
the facult y for knowing.6 In order to gain knowledge of the 
complete t r uth, the Good must be apprehended. A continuation 
of the analogy to the Sun describes the function of the Good. 
1. Rep., VII. 518. 
2. ReQ., VII a 517. 
3. Rep., VI I. 514, 51'7; VI. 508. 
4. Rep., v. 4'78. 
5. Rep., v. 4'78. 
6. Re;e., VI. 508. 
3'7 
Just as sunlight is needed in order to see colours and shapes 
distinctly, so the Good is the cause of understanding of the 
several ob jects of opinion and knowledge.l The individual 
who intuit s the Good is able to recognize the relationship 
of images and things in t he wO' . ..,-l d of flux to the symbols and 
Forms in t he external world. This is wisdom which only a 
few, whose desire for truth keeps them on the path unwaver-
ingly, do attain. 
However , this intelligence is amoral. It may be 
used for either much good or great hann.2 Therefore, men 
must be trai ned f rom childhood through habit and practice, to 
treasure virtue.3 The soul of every ma n has the capacity 
for learning the truth and the educational institution is 
the opportunity for it s development. 4 The welfare of the 
social order, therefore, depends upon an adequate and clos e ly 
organized s stem of education. Thus, to insure this, the 
state must be in control of education.5 
6. The Role of Education 
Plato is the point of synthesis between the ideal-
istic education of the Homeric period and the pragmatic edu-
1. Rep., VI. 508 .. 
2. Re;e_., VII. 519. 
3. Rep., VII. 519. 
4. Rep., VII. 518. 
5. Rep., IV. 424. 
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cation of the a ge of the Sophist s ~ His system avoids b oth 
idolatry of the past as we l l as preoccupation with the present~ 
He l ooks to the future. The aim of a sound system of educat io~ 
is co de ~,:E. ::!. T no e:1 who are better than their forebears physi-
ca l l y and spi r itually.l 
The object i ve of the state is to promote the 
virtuous li fe~2 Only a system based on an ethical princip l e 
can hope to achieve perfect unity. Legis lation a lone is in-
suff i cient to prevent greed and str•ife which arise from the l a c_r 
of virtue . Education must seek to promote lead.ers of the state 
who recognize the gods as the source and unity of virtue.,3 
'I'he treatment of education in the La ws and the 
Republ ic differs only in emphasis. In the Laws, common edu-
cati n for the citiz e ns is developed; in the Republic, only 
the education for the rule rs is e laborate d~ 
i. Co~~non Education 
From infan cJ up to the a g e of three, the aim is to 
a void the experiences of fear, unnecessary pain and excess ive 
. p lea ure~ Fear produces a cowardly nature; unnec e ssary pain 
embitters the dispos ition; a nd excessive pleasure defeats the 
habi t of moderation. To cultivate coursge, gent l eness , bene-
volenc e, and kindness, the psychological needs of the ch1ld 
shou l d be met .. 4 
1., ep~, IV. 424, 425 .. 
2 .. Laws , X I I • 96 3 .. 
3~ Laws, XII. 966. 
4.. Laws, VII. 791, 792 .. 
Between the a ges of three and six, the aim is 
discipline,l wh ich wi ll be cultivated during supervised p l ay. 
The child, howeve r, will not be a llowed to manifest hi s 
natural p l ay instinct when he meets the other chi ldren at t he 
temples.2 The games are determined by the legislature to 
insure the habits of good taste. Uniformity in the outlets 
of all the chi l dren will establish similar habits. If the 
child is allowed innovation in his play, the i nstitutions 
of the state ma y be endangered, for such a child is a poten-
tial revolution i st .3 The duties of the nurses , who supervise 
the play pe riod a nd who are themselves under supervi s ion of 
t welve matrons , are t o maintain proper behavior, orderliness, 
and to s quelch al l signs of self-will.4 
After the age of six, the sexes are separated, but 
the educat i on remains equal.5 To the age of t en, the subject 
mat ter is music and gymnasti cs, which i s subdivided into 
dancing and wr es t ling .6 The aim of music is the improvement 
of the soul.7 Therefore, only the models consecrated by law 
1. ~~ VII. 793-794. 
2. ~~ VII. 797. 
3. Laws, VII. 797, 798. 
4. Laws, VII. 794. 
5. Laws, VII. 794. 
6. Laws , VII . 795 . 
7. Laws, VII . 795. 
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Education for the youth between the ages of ten 
and twenty is divided into three periods. The first three 
years are devoted to reading and writing skills; the fo l low-
ing ll!'ee years. to music composition; and the las t phas e to 
furt be r gyranastics .l 
Higher education begins at the age of t went y . 
Thre e subjects make up the curriculum: a r ithmetic, g eometry, 
and astronomy.. Hov1ever, there will be two k i nds of presenta-
'"' t ion o f the subjects, the one scientifi c and the other p opul ar.G 
The scientific treatment will be for a few c i t izens who are 
s e l ected on the basis of thei r abi l ities as potentia l rul ers; 
whi l e the popul ar treatment is for the masses, who need on l y 
a genera l e ducation~ 
ii. Special Education 
In the Republ ic, the technica l traini.ng for the 
potentia l rul ers is discu ssed .. 3 'l'he earl ier phases of edu-
cati on presented above~ are conc erned with transient objects .. 4 
1. Laws, VII., 810, 814. 
2. Laws, VI I. 8 l 8a 
3. RepQ, VII. 521-541 ~ 
4. Rep., VII. 521. 
This later p ha se progresses to universal and steady objects. 
These studi e s int r oduce the pupils to symbols and first prin-
ciples, and are detached from the world of sense. Thinking 
begins with abstract concepts as the objects of knowledge. 
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The pupils no longer learn by imitation but from understanding. 
Arithmetic forces the mind to call upon reason in order to 
calculate, and to discover the nature of numbers.l Geometry 
trains the mind to comprehend forms and to do independent 
research.2 Astronomy prepares the mind further for ab-
straction by centering the attention on the mysteries of the 
universe.3 
Be tween the ages of thirty and thirty-five, the 
pupils are now concerned with discovering the first principles 
themselves. This stage of education is dialectic. They are 
now able to k now the Forms directly. There is insight and 
true knowledge. The aim of study at this level is to know 
the source of the Forms, to grasp the fundamental principle 
which is the basis of the Forms, the Good. This is the high-
est point of human knowledge. Caution is taken that the 
pupils are not exposed too quickly to this realm of knowledge 
until they are mature enough to avoid confusion.4 
1. Rep., VII. 524, 525. 
2. Rep., VII. 52'7, 528. 
3. Rep., VII. 529 .. 
4. ReJ2•, VII. 532. 
The summit of the intelligible world is 
reached in philosophic discussion by one 
who aspires, through the discourse of reason 
unaided by any of the senses, to make his 
way in every case to the essential reality 
and perseveres until he has g rasped by pure 
intelligence the very nature of Goodness 
itself. This journey is what we call 
Dialecticel 
The last t ·raining comes when the pupils return 
from their isolated studies to apply the principles in an 
active way in the social order.2 The pupils who completed 
the scale of knowledge participate as philo~opher-kings in 
the council of rulers to direct the whole social order.3 
This completes the formal training of the citizens. However, 
in order that they maintain their standard, study must be-
come a conti uous activity in their lives. 
7. The Metaphysical Basis 
I t is d i fficult to state conclusively the meta-
physics of Plato. Is reality one or many, of one kind or 
two or thre e ? The traditional interpretation of Plato's 
concept of reality is that it is a dualistic system whose 
aspects are the realm of Form or Idea e. nd the realm of phen-
omena or matter. There is evidence to support this position 
1. Rep., VII. 539. 
2. Rep., VII, 539, 517, 519. 
____.,_ 
3. Rep., VII, 539-540. 
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in the Repub lic.l The Laws add some slight evidence in the 
discussion which distinguishes between soul and body. Soul 
is prior to b ody and is the origin of all change.2 What con-
fuses the i ssue is that in the Republic, Plato is really con-
cerned with epistemological problems, so that the prob lem: 
of the nature of reality is subordinate to the former. He 
later deals with the metaphys ical basis for the Republic in 
the Timaeus.3 
The problem of being and becoming in Plato comes 
nearer to the solution.4 Metaphysics is the subject matter 
in the Timaeus and the Philebus. Additional information 
with this p r oblem is in the Theaetetus5 and the Sophist. 6 
Bo t h the Timaeus and the Philebus advance a theory 
which clas s ified existence into three kinds, with a domin-
a ting yet transcendent principle as the coordinating factor. 
In the Timaeus, these are the uncreated Forms, souls, and the 
1. Rep., V~ 777 , 478; VI. 505, 506, 508, 509; X. 596. 
2. Laws, X. 892, 893, 895, 896. 
3. Timaeus, 26. 
4. Rep., v. 478, 479; Timaeus, 28, 29, 37-38; Philebus , 54; 
Sophist, 248-252. 
5. Theaetetus, 157. 
6. Sophist , 248-252. 
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Receptacle wi t h the Creator as the principle.l In the 
Philebus, the c la ssification is the Infinite, the Finite, 
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the compound of infinite and finite, and the creative principle~ 
The Forms are the eternal patterns and may be pre-
sumed to be t h e laws of reason from which the creator acts. 
The evidence is t hat they are co-existent with the creator.3 
Souls are i mmorta l though created and are the principle of 
reason. Souls created by the Creator are lesser gods. The 
souls of me n a r e created by the lesser gods.4 The Reeeptacle 
is the ind eterminate locus of creation. As the space-time 
continuum i t i s f ormless.5 
The Fini te is the category of specification and is 
the limited; the defini t e.6 The Infinite is unlimited plur -
ality, the indefinite and the qualitative.? The compound of 
the two is t h e particular and is unity in multiplicity.8 
1. Timaeus, 28, 29, 41, 49, 50. 
2. Philebus , 23, 27. 
3. Timaeus, 28-29. 
4. Timaeus, 41. 
5. Timaeus, 50, 38. 
6. Philebus, 25. 
7. Philebus, 24. 
8. Philebus, 26. 
The following is a summary of the processes of 
reality as e li c ited from the Timaeus and the Philebus. The 
origin of creation is goodness l and reason.2 The Creator 
made the vi sible world because, "He was good, and t he good ••• 
being free from jealousy ••• desired that all things should b e 
as like himself as they could be".3 Therefore, being reason-
a b le, he fi r st created souls, for the soul is the seat of 
reason.4 Tre unive r se was then created through the union 
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of the definite wi th the indefinite (the Forms and the 
Receptacle of the Timaeus), and the limited with the unlimited 
(the Finite and the infinite of the Philebus).5 
The a c tuality of this tangible creation was the 
unsolved problem of becoming for Plato. He admits that t he 
Receptacle a s t he "nurse of all generation" is difficult to 
describe6 and that the compounded is difficult to understand.7 
It is nei ther complete being nor non-being , but manifests the 
characteris t ics of both.8 The impermanence of the world of 
1. Timaeus, 29-30 
2. Philebus, 28. 
3. Timaeus, 29. 
4. Timaeus, 30. 
5. Timaeus, 48; Philebus, 26. 
6. Timaeus, 49. 
7. Philebus, 26. 
8. Rep., v. 478, 479. 
sense viol ated Plato's conviction that rea lity is absolute, 
eternal, int elli gible, and unchangingal In his attempt to 
justify thi s fee l ing , Plato seeks intellectual certainty by 
reverting often to the problem of becoming. 
The question is posed: 
Now if there is something so constituted 
that it both is and is not, will it not 
be between the-purely real and the utterly 
unreal?2 
\Vhat is that which always is and has no 
becoming; and what is that which is a l -
ways becoming and never is ? 3 
A constant passion for any knowledge that 
will reveal to them something of that 
reality which endures for ever and is not 
always passing into and out of existence.4 
And do a ll these things which we call self-
existent exist? or are only those things 
which we see, or in some way perceive through 
the bodily organs, truly existent and nothing 
what ever besides them.5 
The denia l that reality is either all flux or all 
identity is advanced : 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4 .. 
5. 
6. 
Rep., VI. 
Rep., v. 
Timaeus, 
Rep., VI. 
Timaeus , 
The moment seems to imply a something out of 
which change takes p lace into either of two 
states; for the change is not from the state 
of motion a s such; but there is this , curious 
nature which we call the moment lying between 
rest and motion, not being in any time.6 
511, v. 4'76. 
4'76. 
2'7. 
485. 
51. 
Parmenides, 156 .. 
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The philosopher ••• cannot possibly accept 
the notion of those who say that the whole 
is at rest, either as unity or in many 
forms: and we will be utterly deaf to those 
who assist universal motion •••• He will in-
clude both the moveable and immoveable in 
his definition of being and all.l 
The answer is given : 
Th e last two~lief and imagini~ taken 
together constitute the apprehension of 
appearances in the world of Becoming; the 
first two ~nowledge and thinkini7 intell-
i gence concerned with true Being.2 
That which is apprehended by intelligence 
and reason is always in the same state; 
but that which is conceived by opinion 
wi th the he lp of sensation and without 
reason is always in a process of becoming 
and perishing and never really is.3 
Thus have I concisely given the result of 
my thoughts; and my verdict is that being 
and space and generation, these three, 
existed in their three ways before heaven.4 
The conclusion assumed as probable in this thesis 
is t hat the u ltima te reality is one. This ultimate is the 
Creator or crea tive principle, sometimes referred to as the 
Good.5 The attributes of the Creator are intelligence or 
reason, absolute existence, perfection with its correspond-
ing attribute of identity, and goodness. Thus the theory 
that the true, the good, and beautiful are one becomes 
acceptable. 
1. Sophist, 249. 
2. Ren., VI I. 534 .. 
3. Timae~_§!, 28. 
4 .. Timaeus, 52. 
5. Rep., VI. 508; VII. 518; Timaeus, 28; Philebus, 27. 
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This suggestion that Plato's metaphys ics is a 
qualitative and quantitative monism is based on the arguments 
in the Timaeus , the Parrnenides, and the Sophis t . The term 
"quantitative monism" needs modification. It does not mean 
that reality is on e indivisible , undifferentiated totality . 
It implies, ra ther, tha t reality is an integrated unity by 
relation of interacting entities. 
These eritities are three, and are the Creat i ve 
Pr inciple (Creator), the Forms, and Space (Receptacle).l 
The reducti on of r ea lity to this unity in pl urality is 
arrived at through the p r oblems of " being" and "non-being", 
and of "chang e" and " identity." First , "being" must be 
50 
equated with "ident ity" and "non-be ing" wi th "change". Second, 
"being" mus t be considered the characteristic fundamental 
to the Forms,2 and non-being", the chief characteristic of 
the Recepta c le.3 Thir~it must be explained how the Forms 
and the Receptacle, with charac teristics that should make 
them mutually incompa tible ("being" and " non-being"), can 
interact to form the "things" of the sensible world.4 The 
explanation of this interaction is the facto r which decides 
the nature of r eality.5 This problem of interaction i s but 
1., Tima eus , 52; Sophist, 255-256. 
2. Sophist, 245, 248; Timaeus, 28, 29, 52; Philebus, 25. 
3. Sophis t, 238; Timaeus, 38, 49, 50; Philebus, 24. 
4. Timaeus , 50, 51. 
5., Sophi st, 252-25'7. 
a different approach to the problem of becoming with which 
Plato was concerned.l 
The argument must begin with positing mind or in-
telligence as the only causal a gent.2 Both "change" and 
"identity" are necessary to the pe rfect existence of mind.3 
For, motion, which is a necessary aspect of "change", must 
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be an attribute of mind if it is to be deemed causative. 
Creation is movement. On the other hand, identity of the 
mind with i t self mus t be retained if creation i s to be 
possible, f or there must be "other than", if the distinction 
between creator and created is to be valid. However, t he con-
cept of "change" carries with it the notion of more than one, 
for an entity cann ot "chang e" without being other than its e lf. 
Plato resolved t hi s problem by explaining that mind alone is 
such that i t has both unity and p lurality.4 
The Creative Principle is the factor which co-ordin-
ates "being" and "non-being", that is, the Forms and the 
Receptacle.5 "non-being " is neither the one or the many , 
that is, ne ither t he Creative Principle nor the Forms.6 
1 . Discussed earlier in this thesis, 47-49. 
2. Philebus, 30; Timaeus, 29, 30; Rep., VI. 508; Laws, X. 892, 896. 
3. Sophist, 249, 250. 
4. Sophist, 249. 
5. Timaeus, 48, 50-51, 53. 
6. Sophist, 238. 
It exists as re l ation.l As the natural recipient of all 
impressions~ it provides the locus for the relation of 
Forms to one another,2 which by reason of their absolute 
nature would otherwise be mutually exclusive.3 "Being" 
admits of plurali t y for the Forms are infinite in number. 
However, "being" is also a unity, for each Form is one in-
d ivisible unit .4 Although "being" and the "one", are co-
equal and co-ext ensive, "being" does not have the "same 
significance as one."5 The "one" or Creative Principle 
participates in "being" and "non-being" alike.6 It is both 
prior to and afte r its components.? As the causal agent, it 
is prior. As the unity of the three aspects, it is after. 
Nothing could exist without the "one".B Dialectics claims 
the interaction of the Creative Principle with the Forms and 
the Receptacle9 through the principles of identity and 
differentiation.lO 
1. Sophist, 258, 259. 
2. Timaeus , 50. 
3e Parmenide s, 132, 134; Timaeus, 50. 
4. Sophist, 245. 
58 Parmenides, 145, 142. 
6. Parmenide s, 160, 162. 
7. Parmenides, 153-155. 
8. Parmenides, 166. 
9. Sophist, 254. 
10. Sophist, 255-256. 
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Coexistent with the Creator but not separate from 
him are the F orms or ideas , and the Receptacle or space. 
These may be considered part of the nature of the Creator; 
the Forms be ing hi s logical principles or laws of reason and 
the Receptacle be i n g the irreducible element of brute fact. 
This is the Platonic Trinity. 
The relation of the Creator to the Sensible world 
is that he is the source and sustainer of a l l becoming . That 
the things of the world seem to have separate existence, is 
an illusion ere t CJ d by mL ds · nab le to dis tinguish the sha dow 
from the real thing~ 
The re l a tion of the Creator to man as finite soul 
or mind is that of creator to creature~ Man 's role in the 
universe is to strive to attain the virtue or goodness which 
has its supreme manifestation in the Creator . It is only 
when man achieves the virtuous life that he ceases to become 
and attains the unity of identity with the Creator. 
8. The Place of Art 
No other art critic has remained a point of contro-
ve rsy for such a long period as Plato. The reason is that 
Plato was perhaps the fi rs t w estern thinker to fo rmulate 
the idea of censorship. 
Today, with the g rowing interest in Socialism, 
many persons are concerned with the problem of the place of 
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9. The Role of Religion 
Throu gh his concern about the nature of the soul, 
Plato revealed h is interest in the ethical aspect of life. 
The Republic, ha c do, Phaedrus, and the Gorgias discuss the 
problem of i mmortality and life after death. However, it is 
not until the Laws that ethics is incorporated fully into a 
political sett i g . 
In fac t , t he basis of the state is God.l The 
Athenian Stranger opens the dialogue with the question, 
"Tell me, Strangers, is a God or some man supposed to be 
the author of you·r laws? " 2 The object of laws is to make 
their adherent s happy, as all goods , which are of two kinds 
---human and di vine, come from them. Sinc e the human g ood 
is subordinate to the divine g ood, the state which strives 
for the latter will naturally achieve the former.3 
The concept of God has a function in every phase 
of the social o rder for he is the "measure of all things".4 
First, the organizational structure of the state is based on 
the sacred number of 5040, and the sacred number 12. The 
state is divided into twelve sectors, each part dedicat ed to 
1. Laws, I. 624 .. 
2. Laws, I. 624. 
3. Laws, I. 624. 
4. Laws, IV. 716. 
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some god and honored with his name. The citizens are divided 
a lso into twelv e tribes. Each city has a guiding or sacred 
principle given by nature~ 
Since 11 God is the natural and worthy object of a 
man's most seri ous and blessed endeavors",l worship is de-
creed by law. Thi s is. in effec t the advocation of a state 
religion. The state sets up temples to the eods and proclaims 
the form in which wo r ship is to be practiced. There are to 
be 365 sacrifices a year, one each day, and twelve feasts a 
year ce lebrated each month to one of twelve gods. Each 
citizen is reque s ted to live · a holy life dedicated to " sacri-
ficing and singing and .dancing" in order to propitiate the 
g ods.2 He is t o offer prayers and liba tion to god before 
meals and be awa re that his sou l is most divine and his only 
true possession. 
There are to be ap pointed officers of the temple, 
who are to be ch osen by lot, so as to allow guidance in the 
selection by god .3 These pries ts and priestesses, who must 
be ove r sixty y ears of age, are the servants of god. The 
tenure of the p riests and priestesses is one year and no more. 
As interpreters of life, these holy citi zens receive the laws 
about divine things from the Delphic Oracle. 
1. Laws, VI I I. 803. 
2. Laws, VIII. 803. 
3. Laws, VI. 759. 
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Fear of god is to b e part o.f the education of the 
young ~o as to prevent wrongdoing~ especially the evil of 
participation in unnatural loves. 
Ma gist rates and courts of law are built near the 
temples in recognit i on of the foundation of the laws in 
religionv 
The divine goods of· wisdom~ temperance~ justice~ 
and courage are to be within the state through its members 
if the human g oods of health~ beauty, s t rength and wealth 
are to be attained. 
The greatest crime is the negligence of the re-
ligious life. On this principle is based the denial of the 
handicrafts as a vocation to the citizen. Such occupation 
soon becomes a drivin g force to increase one's gains and 
leads to preoccupation with thing s that are eventually har>rn-
ful to the soul. States with an economy so grounded are 
ever at war and disdain peace. 
Religion is the standard by which censorship is 
exercised. The poe't, who has not lived a good life, and 
whose songs are not dedicated to the gods, is prohibited 
from contributing poetry in commemoration of great events. 
This i n tensity regarding religion has made Plato 
criticize the philosophical life which is given so much 
stature in the Republic. He condemns the philosopher's 
emphasis upon mind and criticizes the natural philosophy 
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which explains the universe in scientific terms.l 
In the Republic , what religion is to be abstract ed 
is personal; in the Laws, religion is dogmatic. This change 
i~ compatible with the tone of pessimism which seems to be 
the underlying vein distinguishing the Laws from the Republic. 
In the Republic, knowledge of the Good is followed by the 
g ood life. In the Laws, knowledge is not sufficient to 
insure goodness nd must be supplemented by the enforcement 
of Laws. 
10. The State and Citizenship 
i. The State 
The ex l stence or origin of the state is based on 
the principle of na tural contract,2 and on the principle of 
the common holding of goods~3 
In the Republic , a society is a natural state where 
man , because he is not self-sufficient, is ln voluntary asso-
ciation with othe r men through a mutual exchange of the values 
of their unique capaciti es.4 This simple society expands as 
other values besides those necessary for mere ·existence are 
developed. 
1. Laws, x. 886, 889, 890; Philebus, 28. 
2. Rep., II. 368, 369. 
3. Laws, I I I. 6'79; Rep., II. 369; v. 461. 
4. Rep., II. 368, 369. 
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The bes t state, therefore, is that which maintains 
a relation ba sed u pon the natural distinction according to 
individual aptitu de. This relation is to be maintained in 
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a ll sphe res. It i s only on this basis that justice for al l 
may be achieved.l However, distinction is not all in the well-
organized state. There must also be a unity wherein each 
individual citizen i s a n integral part.2 This notion of unity 
has its attendant obligations. In keeping with the recog -
nition that all men are not equal in the capacity to fill al l 
f unc tions, there are those few who can rule and the many who 
must accept the position of the r u led.3 Thus legislation 
wi ll be made not t o satisfy the wishes of the mas ses but 
ra ther to meet the true n eeds and interests of the group.4 
Should the masses choose to disobey such l egis lation, then 
the harmony and unity of the state will be di s rupt ed. 
Oth~r distinguishing features of the be s t state 
are that it is pea ceful.5 Ne ither wealth nor poverty exi st to 
h inder the spirit of friendliness tha t should permeate its 
structure.6 
1. Rep., IV. 43 4, 441. 
2 . Rep. , v. 462. 
3. Laws, II~~ 689; I. 643; Rep., IV. 431. 
4 . Statesman, 293-301. 
5. Laws , I. 625 .. 
6. Laws, III. 679, 694; v. 738. 
ii. The Citizenship 
The members of the social order are of three groups. 
There are the cit i zens proper of the state, the metics or 
foreigners who reside in the state, and the slaves. This 
division found in t he society delineated in the Laws, is a 
departure from the n a tural classification which would have 
arisen from the e x e r cise of social contract expressed in 
the Republic, or f r om a 1't ( t e chne) as the norm to determine 
funct ion as a dvanced in the Statesman. 
The question may be asked whether Plato intention-
al l y abstracts those approaches to the internal structures 
of the state, or whether each view ·is a revision of the other. 
The latter suggestion seems more p lausible. As Plato's zeal 
inc1•eased, he wishe d to have his idea of a social order take 
root in a reform of the Athenian state. The lofty ideals of 
the Republic were t oo i naccessible. After the unha ppy expe r-
ience of Plato at Syracuse, . the Laws represents his gr eatly 
modified but acces s i b le social order. 
The numbeP of the citizens is not to exceed 5040.1 
S uch a number is convenient for it facilitates the division 
of property;2 which should be neither more nor less than t hat 
1. Laws, v. 737; cf. Rep., IV. 423. 
2. Laws, v. 738; VI. 771. 
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which a llows a moderate standard of living.l It mus t be re-
called that excess in either wealth or poverty will result in 
loss of ha1~ony in the state. 
In the i deal s ta te, the citizens would comprise one 
b i g family2 with no c /.a.s s dis t inction, arid have all possess-
ions i n common.3 Howeve r , Plato regrets that this is not 
possible.4 Precise equali ty in posses s ions cannot be l e gis-
lated. Some will a ccumul ate more than others. In addition, 
inequality of weal th provides a more objective standard for 
c las s ification than either a nces try or personal charm.5 
The most that the sta te can do is to limi t the amount of 
possess i ons so tha t neither extreme wealth n or poverty 
exlsts. Ci tizens who acctunulate in excess of tha.t allowed 
by the sta te must ' g ive back the surplus t o the state, an d 
to the Gods who are patrons of the state."6 Failure t o do 
this will invit e s evere punishment~ 
1. Laws, v. 737. 
2. Rep., v. 462e ff . 
3. Laws, v. 744. 
4. Laws, v. 744. 
5. Laws, v. 744 . 
6. Laws, v. 745. 
68 
Such limitation on possessions is to insure the 
happiness of the citizens . Their proper concern should be 
the .attainment of v irtue .1 Preoccupation with acquiring 
wealth becomes dis t ract ing and interferes with education 
for the g ood life. 
An addit ional objection is that the very rich man 
cannot be a good man .. Plato f e els that it :ls only by dealing 
in unjust as well as just methods that an individual can 
acquire qealth. The refore, after having proved that the un-
just life leads to unhappiness,2 he is conf ident that limit-
ation on possession protects the best interest of the citi-
zens .. 
The life o f the citizens i s to be devoted to the 
g ods and to the development of their menta l and physical 
capacities.3 Therefore, they should perform the necessary 
duties connected wi t h pu b lic and private life as quickly as 
possible during the first part of each day, leaving the re-
mainder free for the pu~sui t of the good life,4 that is, in 
st.r;;c dy. 
This is the reason for the presence of metics and 
slaves in the socia l order. These members assume the respon-
1. Laws, VI. 770; IV. 718; Rep., IV. 441. 
2 . Rep., IX. 5'76-587. 
3. Laws, VII. 803, 807. 
4. Laws, VII. 808; VIII. 847. 
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sibility for providing the products necessary to the economic 
health of the state. They can be likened to subject nations. 
Without the privileg e of citizenship , nevertheless, they must 
conform to the jurisdiction of legi slation. 
Metics are fore igners who have settled within the 
state. They are welcome on condition that they work as art-
isans and agree to leave at the end of twenty years. All 
that is required of them is good conduct. Those who have 
contributed exceptionallyto the progress of the state may 
petition for an extension of stay .. l To them are relegated 
the occupation of retail 't rade, the buying and selling of 
goods.2 Citizens a re prohibited from trading because of its 
tendency to generate corruption.3 
Thus Plato would risk the souls of non-citizens, 
for their "corruption wil l be the least injury to the state• "4 
Is this a singular lack of the spirit of humanism in Plato? 
Perhaps, for one who has shown so much insight in the nature 
of man, this is disturbing. Yet, this is a manifestation of the 
essential Greekness of Plato that he should dismiss non-Greeks 
as unwo r•thy of being save d? 
1. Laws, VII. 850 .. 
2. Laws, XI. 920. 
3. Rep .• , IX. 580; VIII. 553-554; Laws, XI .. 918-919. 
4. Laws, XI. 919. 
How does lato conceive of slavery? The Greek word 
for slave·ry ( o ov/ .ZEt.t.) had cHfferent meanings.l The legal 
definition covers the absence of political rights or inde-
pendence. The moral definition covers the lack of depth of 
knowledge and strength of will. The definiti9n in terms of 
social relations indicates the subjects of absolute govern-
ment. Plato uses t he term "slavery" in all these forms.2 
Thus~ -.slave ry~ is the vorst condition of existence. 
To preserve the best existence for the citizens, Plato in-
sists that law must prevent the practice of enslavement among 
·' Hellenes.3 Slaves should be acquired from other na t ions.4 
Unfortunate as i t is that Plato should allow this 
mi serable life for men in his ideal s tate, yet he a tt empts to 
a lleviat e some of t he undes irable practices connected with 
the institution of slavery. 5 His reforms, however~ are made 
not so much for the betterment of the slaves themselves but 
with an eye for securing the most benefits for the state. 
1. Morrow, Art.(l939), 186-201. 
2. Rep.~ VIII. 569; IX. 5'76-5'78; Laws~ VI. 7'76. 
3. Rep., v. 469 .. 
4. Laws, VI. 7'7'7. 
5. Morrow, Art.(1939)~ 186-201 .. 
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Slaves who are justly treated are less likely to revolt.l 
Also, slaves who have virtuous masters will in some degree 
0 
absorb a little virtue through association.~ 
The slaves have no separate occupation such as the 
metics, who have exclusive right to the crafts and co~merce. 
Their duti e s are determined by those of the citizens who are 
their masters. In other words, the slaves are the assistants 
who perform the labor under the direction and supervision of 
the citizens.3 
iiie The Administration 
The aim of legislation is "to secure the greatest 
possible happiness for the community as a whole. 11 4 To pro-
teet this aim, there must be constant vigilance to curtail 
any "innovation upon the established system of education 
either of body or of'mind. 11 5 
In the Republ~c and the Statesman 1 Plato minimizes 
the rule of legislation to perfect the social order.6 The 
1. Laws, VI. 777 .. 
2. Laws, VI. 777. 
3. Laws, VI. 778; VII. 806; IV. 720 
4. Rep., IV. 420. 
5. Rep., IV. 424. 
6. Sta tesman, 294; Rep., IV. 425, 427. 
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philosopher-kings a nd the statesmen are above law.l However, 
with his later disposition toward the practical rather than 
the ideal, Plato, in the Laws, reverses the position of the 
rulers and the law. The rulers become the servants of law. 
Nevertheles s, he retains the principal character traits which 
distinguishes those who are to rule from the masses. The 
Republic and the State sman support an aristocratic monarchy 
or at most an oliga.rchy, but the Laws introduces a form of 
representative government. 2 
In the Law s , political obli gation is distributed 
among tour bodies. The se are the Nocturnal Council, the 
( 
Chief Magistrates, t he Sena te, 'and The General Assembly. 
The Nocturna l Council is the advisory board of the 
State. Its duties a r e to review the laws and to suggest addi-
tions to the law based on the findings of obse rvers of other 
forms of g ove rnment .3 The members of this body are the sages 
of the social order. They are the priests who have a tta i ne d 
perfect virtue, the ten eldest guardians (minimum age is 
sixty) who have spent at least ten years traveling and study-
ing the constitutions of other states, the minister of edu -
cation, and all forme r ministers of education, and their pro-
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teges (between the a ges of t hirty and forty} who are promising 
1. Rep., VI~ 500; Statesman, 297. 
2. Laws, VI. 757. 
3. Laws, XII. 952, 961. 
young leaders .. l Thi s formi dable group is the t1preserving 
') power" in the state . -
The ma gist ra t es who number thirty-seven, are 
elected for a term of not more than twenty years by the 
citizens. They are chosen by a process of elimination through 
three consecutive ele ctions,3 and must be between fifty and 
seventy years of a ge. 4 Their responsibilit_es a re to legis-
late ,5 to be guardians of t he law, and to register the pro-
perty holdings of the citizens. They also nominate the men 
from among which three generals will be elected • . These gen-
era ls in turn appoint the rest of the military officials. 0 
The Senate will consist of three hundred-sixty 
members, that is, ninety representatives for each class.? 
The se men shall be elected .by the cit izens under compulsory 
vote , 8 thei r term of offi ce lasting for only one year.9 To 
1. Laws, XII. 951, 961 , 
2. ~, XII. 961 , 
3. Laws, VI. '753. 
4. ~, VI. '755. 
5. Laws , VI. '769. 
6. Laws, VI. '755-'756. 
7. Laws, VI. 756. 
8. Laws, VI. '756. 
9. Laws, VI. '756. 
'74 
this group belong the sphere of the Department of Interior. 
'rhey supply informa t ion concerning the s tate and are alert 
to internal disturbances.l 
Other offici als whose affair is the municipality 
of the state will be either appointed or elected. These 
shall be the wardens of the city, the wardens of the ~Q.r.~­
(market-place), the clergy, t he interpreterB of the Delphic 
Orac le, and the temple treasurer.2 
The General As s embl y is made up of the remainder 
of the citizens who a re summoned and adjourned by the Senate.3 
Att endance at the call to assembly i s compulsory for citi zens 
of the fi rst two calsses under penalty of f ine . The citizens 
of the third a nd fourth class are free to attend at will ex-
cept in cases of grea t importance, a t which time the sunrrnons 
will take the form of a command to a ll .4 Thus, Plato has 
conceded to se lf-government in the accessible social order. 
1. Laws, VI. 758 . 
2. Laws , VI. 759-760 .. 
3. Laws, VI. 758. 
4. Laws , VI. 764. 
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II. Conclusion and Recapitulation 
Every philosophy which is to move beyond the realm 
of pure theory int o the sphere of utility through practical 
application must have an interpreta tion of man and his re-
lation to the uni v e r se. From such an investigation ethics 
or a system of values invariable is formed. This is not the 
tota l effect of a theory of man, however, for in addition t o 
those already mentioned, it is the core of the political 
theory evolved. To understand a certain society and its form 
of organization is to become acquainted with the theory of 
man upon which it has foundation . 
There are cert ain positions which the observer of 
mankind can takee Man may be thought of either as innately 
bad, i.e., selfish, or as innately g ood, i.e., altruistic, 
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or as neither good nor bad by nature but the product of in-
fluences, or as having qiological and psychol og ical limitations, 
which he can overcome by use of his will to determine his re-
sult i n g na ture. 
The fourth position seems to express the Platonic 
c onception. Perhaps it is here that the clue to guide us 
in abstracting a composite picture of the citizen is found. 
His discussion of the sou l with its hierarchical 
parts of reason, spirited element, and the appetites define 
the psychological factor in man, and the biolog ical factor 
is given in his postulation that each individual comes into 
being endowed with unique abilities. Man's function is to 
fulfill his nature by living in accord with his rational 
principl e and by developing his special abilities which be-
come useful onl y in its place in the social order. 
The g ood for Plato is both absolute and relative. 
As an absolute principle, it is that efficient fulfillment 
of function in the whole. As a relative pri-nciple, it is 
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that each function is different and arranged in a hierarchical 
scale. Therefore, ~ince every man can fu l fill his function, 
it is possible for all men to be good but not equally g ood. 
What are the virtues which man must seek to develop? 
When "each part of his nature is exercising its proper function, 
of ruling or being ruled" then a man may be _ca lled virtuous 
and possesses the virtue.l When reason rul es and guides the 
other parts of .the soul, the virtue is wisdom; when the 
spirited e lement is in true f unction, the virtue is courage; 
when there is "unanimity and concord" of all those parts, 
when there is " no conflict between the ruling e lement and 
its two subjects", the virtue is temperance. The tota l state 
of the soul in an inclusive harmonious overture results i n 
the supreme virtue of justice.2 
The wi ll of the citizen in the social order is to 
know the good and thus attain the virtuous life. As was 
1. Rep., IV. 442. 
2. Rep., IV. 442-443. 
pointed out earlier, the efficacy of the will depends upon 
the UJ."lique capacities of the individual. Thus all cannot know 
the g ood equally but rather, each can know degrees of the 
whole. Citizens, therefore, are distinguishable through 
their knowledge. The state, being just, gui des them up the 
ladder with the educational system. At that point where 
each can go no higher, there is his position. 
The c i t izen who reaches the top and knows the good 
in its entirety is the phi losopher and the only member who 
is fit to rule. He i s the man whose actions are virtuous 
without e ffort, b ecause he can discern the essence of things 
without ever confusing the parts that partake of their char-
acter. He is tl1e statesman for he has the techne of ruling 
whi ch requires a knowledge of the whole. He can direct t h e 
state . 
The citizen who understands the clistinctions among 
things, k nows the good as relative. He lacks knowledge of 
the absolute g ood but is capable of executing the duties 
specifi ed by the ins i ght of the ruler. Thls ci ti z en ' s role 
is t o a s s is t the philosopher i n protecting the virtues of 
the state by keeping its functions distinct . 
The ci tizen who ca~~ot separate the natures of 
things into theirs everal categ ories but who is mere l y aware 
of their exi stenc e is nevertheless able to work with thes e 
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thing s. Efficiency, however, must come with instructions 
given by the rul er through the assistants. Without his guid-
anc e this most limited citizen would end in confusion and be 
unable to a chi eve h is individual g oal, for lgnorance of his 
prope r functi on would result in disorder and eventua l l y un-
happiness for himse l f and others in the social order. 
Despite the division of the c iti z e ns in terms of 
t~e most virtuous , l ess virtuous, and the least virtuous all 
are i mportant to the state. The removal of one is the dis-
so l uti on of the social orde r . 
Man is a composite of the spiritua l and the physical. 
Hi s essence is the spiri tua l e lement and thus h e is immortal; 
his phys ica l nature i s the concretion of hi s essence i n t he 
sensible world. He is elevated above the l eve l of othe r li ving 
thing s by the peculia r qua l ity of h is soul. 
In addition to the senses and the wi ll , ~hi ch he 
has l n common with anima l s , he is b le ssed with i n tellect. 
Therefore , he is b;; nature mo ra l a nd capable of ethics. His 
~;)art icular func tion , as mora l creature, is to realize t o the 
fullest capacity the conditions of a virtuous life. To b e 
i gnorant of t h j s function i s the g r eatest evil. To th l s end , 
he mus t exercise the reas on of the soul in c ontrol of h i s 
wi ll a n d h is sensibl e des ires. 
The intellect is the instrument of' communication, 
there f ore man is a social crea ture. As e a ch individual is 
born with uni que abilities which make him capable of excell-
ence in on e particular function, it. is the duty of man to 
himself and to his companions, to associate himself with 
others in a social order, wherein, the exchange of skills 
a n d capacities·, will provide each with the proper medium for 
development and self-realization. 
Reality is one but has the appearance of many. 
This illusion a rises from the fact that there are degrees of 
Reality. The true essences of things are in the realm of 
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F'orms and their concretion, in the realm .of the Sensible World. 
All things participate in both realms, including man. 
It is only through the law of reason, which is 
order and so orders all thing s, that man is able to dis-
tinguish between the true essences of things as they exist in 
the realm of Forms from the imitations of the essences by the 
physical objects in the realm of the Sensible World. 
As there are degrees of reality, so are there de-
grees of knowledge of the law of reason. Man's status in the 
social order, then is determined by the approximation of his 
individual reason to the genera l law.. He who achieves the 
highest use. of his rea s on is wisest and as philosopher should 
be king. He who attains the next lower l evel is courag eous 
and as guardian should protect the state. He who falls in the 
lowest level is acquisitive andE-s worke r shoul d p roduce the 
goods for the state. 
The social structure is the instrument thi•ough 
which man and reali ty interact. The inst itutional core is 
education~ The g oal is the harmonious unity with an organic 
order. The result is development of individua l capacities. 
The mechanism is g ove rnment through knowledge of t he essence 
of r eality .. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DEFINITION OF PLATO'S THEORY OF SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION, ITS RELATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
le The Definition 
Plato states in Epistle VIIthat he has written no 
work which describes his philosophy of the various subjects 
which he t~ught~ He hints that if he had formulated such a 
philosophy, he would cownunicate it only to a privileged few 
whose understanding merits such a discourse. Plato, appar-
ent l y , is mindful of the les son which the life of Socrates 
taught him. The product of his years of contemplation are 
too vital and sacred to him to be made the object o~ contempt 
and to be used indiscreetly by the base majority.l 
However, it would be strange if he d1.d not believe 
in the doctrines which he expresses through the writings of a 
lifetime. Whatever his reason for cautioning Dion on this 
point, we must proceed as if it were not said, as if his 
writ ings are to be understood as being more than literary 
accompli shments. The Seventh Epistle was written by a dis-
il l usioned Plato who saw his precious ideals, as found in 
the Re.r:ublic and other dialogues written before hls venture 
in Syracuse, in disrepute. His own words witness this obser-
vat ion. 
1. Epistle, VII. 341 c, e; 342. 
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If, however•, he really was seriously con-
cerned with these matters and put them in 
writing, then surely not the gods , but 
mortals have utterl~ blasted his wits?l 
• • L 
Plato's theo ry of social organization cannot be 
defined by any "ism, " such as have cluttered the nineteenth 
century. The social order is not merely a political struct-
ure, but is the phenomenal representation of the noumena l 
o1~der which exists in the realm of ideas .2 
Like every object in the sensible world, the state 
has a form.3 Thus every institution which is establi shed 
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mu st be incorporated so as to bring the state nearer and nearer 
to the perfection of its ideal. 
For the state to achieve this objective, it must 
exemplify the saving principle of a unity which transcends 
the multiplicity of its parts.4 
There must be the recognition that although there 
is plurality in unity , the re1at iv·e exists for the sake of 
the absolute. 5 Inasmuch as the realm of forms presents order 
1. Epis t le ,VII, 344c, d. 
2 .. Timaeus, 30, 52, 88. 
3. Rep., VI. 50'7. 
4. Theaetetus, 204; Laws, XII. 962; Rep., v .. 461. 
5. Philebus, 16-1'7, 53. 
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by its hierarchical system, so must the state order its cha os 
by the subor•dination of the many to the one. In this manner, 
each part of the social order r eceives meaning from participa-
tion in the total meaning, for there can be no mean:t.ng without 
I'ela tion. 
The unifying factor in the state is the universa l 
a c ceptance of the principle that man's proper duty is to 
s e ek the divine.l "God is the natural and worthy object of 
our most serious and blessed endeavors. "2 Justice in the 
state differentiates the parts of the whole through their 
particul ar functions, but v:t.rtue in the st2.te i s the re-
unit i ng of the parts of the who l e as one.3 
Plato's social s tructure is fashioned to this 
end. The phi l osopher, as the only citizen who can grasp the 
r elation of the parts to the whole, is the individual who 
mu st bring order to the chaotic mass of confused citizense 
He represent s the creator in the s ensible world. 
If this proposed definit ion of Plato's social phi lo-
s ophy is valid, then it is difficul t to understand the struggle 
by vari ous factions to reconcile it with any form of social 
theory, namely , Utopianism, Fascism, Socialism, or Democracy . 
1. Timaeus, 90$ 
2. Laws:, VII. 803. 
3. Rep., IV .. 432, 442. 
Plato would not have recognized any one as the 
one, im.rnutable, perfect state. The test lies in the dif-
ferences between the world of becoming and the world of 
forms. Forms are changeless ; things are perishable. Forms 
are perfect; things are imperfect. The woi•ld of forms is 
one; the world of becoming many. Thus any state existing 
in the sensible world is destined to succumb to the flux of 
things. The best state, however, constantly striving to 
a v oid that change which leads to decay, eventually goes the 
way of all sensible things. Hope for the future is in the 
fact that the eternal Form will again become concrete. 
What shape succeeding states will have is unpredictable. 
2~ Plato and Utopianism 
Utopias are the dreams of men with a vision. They 
v isualize the perfect society wherein the g oods necessary 
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for existence are equitably distributed, wherein the indivi dual 
can realize himself spiritually as well as physically. It is 
this urge to find utopia which make s life tolerable. This 
privi lege to idealize distinguishes men .from beasts, and is 
the path to salvation for the world~ 
Plato and Sir Thomas ~ore are among the many writers 
who have had this "w111- to-utopia." 
Berneri quotes George Woodcock on this statement 
of More ' s Utopia: 
A k i nd of extension to a logical conclusion 
of Plato's Republic and all 'the other utopias 
which were hostile to human individuality.l 
Contrary to Woodcock' s opinion, this is the very 
basis of their difference . More was attacking the concept 
of individuality prevalent at his time. He was attempting 
to establish the principle of the brotherhood of man, and 
with it, the equality of all men.2 In Utopia, all citizens 
without ex ception, participated in all fo~1s of social life 
---production, protection of the state, and government. 
More 's Utooia was clas s less. All members of the state were 
citizens, and all lived the co~munal life.3 
Plato's social order stemmed from the desire to 
liberate individuality. Th~ citizens are stratified in 
accord with their fun ction, which is kept distinct as leg -
is lators, protectors of the state, and produ cers. 
The objection may n ow be raised that Plato shifted 
rather than liberated individuality. The answer rests on 
1. Berneri, JTU, Xi. 
2. UTO, (Armes ed.), 170. 
3. UTO, (Armes ed. ), 88 ff. 
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the mea n ing of individuality. To be individua l is to be 
unique. l No two p e rs ons possess equa l aptitudes in all. 
thi~gs~ The acceptance of the uniqueness of personali ty may 
possibly l ead t o anarchy. However, the lawlessness of anarchy 
would eventually destroy persona l ity . One cannot exerci se and 
deve l op individuali ty either in vacuo or when, in social 
communion, one is free to act without a limiting framework 
for reference . In the forn1er, individuality has no meaning ; 
and in the l atter, overl apping or confli cting interests wi ll 
impose a force ful limit. Individuality deve lops at its opti-
mu.rn1 no t c entrifugally but ra t her in a straight line. Plato, 
who experi enced the effects of a growing anarchy during the 
fourth century, was all t oo awa re of t his . 
Despite the diffe rence of the purposes underlying 
the ideal societies of Plato and More, the authors evolved 
st r ikingly similar inst i tutions to a dvance t he materialization 
of these purposes. A few examp le s are 1) the emanicipa t ion 
of women by providing equal e ducation and equal opportunity 
for pub lic office, 2) the regul ation of marriage by the 
state and the rep l acement of the natural fami l y with the 
civil family, 3) the commu.~ity of property, 4) the prohi-
bit ion of the possess ion of gol d or silver, 5) the estab-
l ishment of the mi n imum working-day. 
1 . Rep., II. 369. 
The se and other similarities come from the con-
viction tha t the good and virtuous l ife is possibl e only 
from the recognition th£Jt man's purpose is to look to the 
divine,· who as the princ iple of the law of reason is a bove. 
everyt hing and is the only true guide for action. Both Plato 
and Mor e held that the life acco rding to nature is that which 
seeks to develop the inte l ligence pecul iar to man. 
Yet, Plato would have denied that More ' s utopia 
was just. The principle which distinguishes the members 
according to function is l acking in Utopia~ Therefore, Plato 
woul d assert that More had not truly grasped the concept of 
the whole, for the nature of the One is not unlim:i.tedly, un-
dividedl y one , but manye l 
3. Plato and Fascirun 
Can the Platonic socia l o rder be labeled fascist? 
Before an answer is offered, an inquiry into what constitutes 
Fascism is called for. 
Popular opinion c l assifie s the social o rder which 
exl sted in Germe.ny during the Naz:.t regime, along with that of 
Italy under Mussolini's rule, as well as that of Spain under 
Franco, as Fascistic. Acton, in his artic le refuting the 
alleged Fasci sm of Plato, deals only with the Hitler rule.2 
1 . Parmenides, 1 44 ff. 
2. Acton, Art. ( l938 ), 302-312. 
88 
The position in this thesis is to make a distinction which 
is i n a g r eement with Oa keshott. The German state under 
Hit ler should ri ghtly be called Nationa l Socialism. Mus solini 
is the true author of Fasc ism, and it is only from him that 
the " sol e re liabl e statement of the doctr:i.ne '' has come.l 
Fascism is distinguishab le from Nationa l Socia li sm 
chiefl y in the area of economics and its l ack of Racism, 
whi ch cha racteri zed the National Socialist Ol"der.. It re-
pud i ates socialism as backward.2 In the words of Mussolini, 
" Neither has Fascist concep tion of authority anything i n 
common with that of the police-ridden state."3 Fascism is a 
new fact in hi s tory~4 
The following development of the pri nciples in 
Fascism is based on the artic l e, "The Doctrine of Fa scismn , 
submitted by Mussolinl to t he Enciclopedia I taliana in 1932. 5 
1. Oakeshott , SPDCE, 163. cf. Hoern1e, Art ~(l938), 166-182. 
2 .. Mus solini, DOF, 20. 
3. Mussolini , DOF, 25. 
4. Mussolini, DOF, 25, 29. 
,.. 
o. Mussolini, DOF, 7-31. 
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The Fascist stJ te is the synthesis of all values 
into the one value desigiated by the" leader.l Patriotism is 
al legiance to the princiwle that the state is the only true 
individual. 2 The citize , , by himself, has no value outside 
the state.3 
The Fascist st, te is a very moral social order. 
It is the morality of StoicisP.la The citizen must be serious , 
re li gious , and self- denyJnga He must disdain the c omfort-
able life in favo r of a ~ ife of discipline and work~4 
The Fascist st~te, the highest and most p owerfu l 
form of personality , is te spiritual force which a ssumes 
the moral and intellectu] l life of individual men. It is 
the t otality of all persJnal ities, for man is conceived not 
as an individual s eparatJ d from all others and standing by 
himself, but as a facet af the only true reality, which is 
the state.5 
Therefore, as a ' individual must f ight to survive , 
so must the state fi ght to preserve its personality. There 
1. Mussolini, DOF, '7. 
2. Mussolini, DOF, 10-11. 
3. Mussolini, DOF, 10. 
4 .. Mussolini, DOF, 8, 9. 
5. Mussolini, DOF, 8, 13. Also, the "Charter of Labor" 
(April 21, 1927 ) in D~F, 133. 
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s no lasting peace in the world where the species is ever 
in the s truggle of the "survival of the fittest. " The citi-
z en must ever be prepared for war. The "Fascist Decalo aue"l b 
re inforces this militarism. Note points (1), (5), and (7) of 
t he 1934 version. 
(1) Know that the Fascist and in particular 
the soldier, must not believe in pe rpet-
ual peace. 
(5) The rifle and cartri dg e belt, and the 
rest, are confide d to you not to rust 
in leisure, but to be preserved in war~ 
(7) Discipline is the soul of armies . 
Mussolini has given an external e~planation for 
most aspects of the Fascist doctrine. There is one which 
he does not attempt to explain , however, and tha t is, the 
ori g in of the supremacy and unconte s ted power g iven t h e word 
of the Duce~ Points (8) and (10) of the 1934 edition of the 
"Fasc i st Decalogue " and point (10) of the 1938 edition state, 
"Mussolini is always r i ght, " and rione thing must be dear to 
y ou above all: the life of the Duce. "2 
What are t he characteristics of Fascism in light 
of these statements13 
1. "Fascist Decalogue" (Oakeshott ed. 1 SPDCE , 180 -181) . 
· Muss olini, DOF, 35-36. 
2. " Fascist Deca l ogue" (Oake shott ed., SPDCE , 180-18 1) . 
Al so 
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3 .. Cf. Acton, Art. ( 1 938) , 302-312 .. Also 1.ussolini, DOF, 7-42 .. 
1 . It is a revolt agains t reason. The eMotions 
of the citizens are appealed to on an ethical basis. Italy 
has a strong reli g ious tradition through the Roman Catholic 
Church.. The history of discipline and self-denial in . serv ice 
t o one principle can be traced through the re l igious orders 
of the monastic life. This tradit:i.on had already establ ished 
that happiness i n this worl d is not a worthy end. Thus when 
Hussolini stated that, " Fascism ••• does not consider 'happ i-
ness' is possible upon earth" , the citizens were not shocked. 
2. It contends that the best culture or civiliza-
t ion is that which survives. This survival .• however, is 
maintained by might r a ther than right reason. 
3. It has a single rigid morality~ This is the 
ethica l will of the s t ate which is the creator of right. 
4 . It is nationalistic with priva 1:;e and group 
int erest subordinat ed to the good of the nati on. 
5 . I t is based on an acceptance of ethi cal re l a-
ti vism. Therefore, unity is secured through the va l ue 
dict~ted by the stat e. 
6 It ho l ds that persona l ity is stronger than laws. 
Hence the concentration of power i n the Duct9~ 
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7~ It denies teleology¥ There is no p l an in history; . 
therefore, no progress. The concern of the sta t e i s to solve 
only the problems which arise historical l y of themselves in 
themse l ves. 
The points of contac t with Fascism in Plato are 
t h ose a ris ing from organizationa l similarit;v . The Platonic 
socia l order with its hierarchical organization for the we ll-
o r dered state in which there is government by experts for· the 
p e ople ' s good rather than the peopl e's wishes; its state con-
t r•ol of economics, reli e;i on , and educat ion; its rigid censor-
s hip of art and mora l s; its proces s of indoctrinati on t h rough 
soc ia l and political myth s are al l e lements of authoritarian-
ism c ompatible with the Fascist state. 
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To ca ll Plato a Fascist, however, is to conf use the 
means with t he end and to deny the special spirit of Platonism. 
Th e very basis of Pla to's socia l orde r is the rejection of 
i rrat ionalism. Rea son dominates the Spirited Element and the 
Appetites. Leadership is not by the migh t iest but the wisest. 
His l egis l ators are carefull y educated men who l ead virtuous 
l ives. No s tat ement in Mu ssolin i's article provi des this 
distinction. 
Plato, in rejecting the position of the Sophists, 
d e· ie~ the validity of relativism. ·Values are abso l ute and 
ob j e ctive with their source in the Good. The philosopher-
king d oes n ot originate values , but me re l y g rasps the i r 
e ssence in contempl ation of the Good~ He is the interpreter, 
no t the creator of values. 
Plato rejects war and advocates peace. l 
1. Laws, I. 628 ; VIII. 828~ 
War• is a necessary evil which must be avoided as much as 
possible. The virtuous life cannot be maintained in the 
disorder of a stat e at war. Persuasion is far nobler than 
force, 1 and the gentle r it is, so is the degree of superiority 
it has in the intercou rse of men. Hoernle raises a note of 
dissent about the paci fism of Plato as he asks: 
What is the purpose of the a1>rned he lpers 
in Plato's Ideal State, in their relation 
to the internal enemies of the city, ex-
cept to execute, at the behest of the phil-
osopher-king s, such moral and social sur-
gery on infection---spots of spiritual 
disease?2 
Plato might have answered that force is justifi-
able i f the g ood of the whole is to be ach ieved. Consistent 
pacifism is nihilism. The social order must be protected 
from attack by nations seeklng to expand their territorial 
possessions,3 as well as the subversive activities arising 
i nternally.4 Therefore, the rulers must have adequate know-
ledge in the strategies of warfare,5 and provide training in 
peacetime, as a precaution to keep the military element pre-
pared.6 Only the rulers have the authority to declare war . 
1. Laws , x. 887; IV. 720. 
2. Hoernle, Art.(l938), 166-182 . 
3. Rep., II. 3?3. 
4. Rep., IV. 422; VIII. 547 .. 
5. Statesman, 304. 
6. Laws, VIII. 829, 830; XII. 942. 
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Citizens who promote strife for personal g ain will receive 
c a p i ta l punishment. 1 
Plato, therefore, would reject the mi l itary ste.te 
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of Fascism on the same gro:mds that he based his distinction of 
wl at constitutes a crime in the Laws~ It is thi s, t hat the 
int ent or purpose of the act is more important in judging 
its ri ghtnes s than the results.2 
The s imilarity of t he structures of the two social 
orders may be said to a:rise from agreement in the following 
s ent i ment echoed by Mussol ini : 
Fascism denies that numbers, as such, can 
be the determining factor in human society . 3 
Democracy is a kingless reg ime infested by 
many kings who are sometimes mo re exclu s i ve, 
tyrannical, and destructive than one, even 
if he b e a tyrant.4 
4. Plato and Socialism 
On the basis of the Republic, v. ·45'7 B-466 D and 
t he Laws, VII. 80'7 B, Plato h~s gained a reputation for ad-
vancing the cause of Communism . Again, it can be shown that 
1. Laws , XII. 955 .. 
2. Laws, IX. 862 .. 
3. Mu s solini, DOF, 21. 
4. Mussolini, DOF, 21-22 .. 
to allege such a sy stem as the important doctrine of his 
works is to fall into misinterpr etation through the error of 
misplaced emphasise 
By applying the method of comparison used in se c ti on 
three, it is h op ed tha t a conclusion free from distortion may 
b e obt ained. 
The definition of Socialism is diffi.cu lt to form, 
fo r the theories of human society advanced under its label 
are several and varied. Historically , Sociali sm can be r e-
duc ed to the principle that pri vate property is inherently 
evil, and t hat t o overcome the ill-effects which it fosters 
i n society, it is necessary to abolish it entirely in favor 
of public-owned property. The corre l ative eondition follow-
ing upon this , is a clas s less society wherein all g oo d s are 
e ui tab l y d is tributed. 
Socialism usually follows the development of an 
indus trial revo l uti on in a nation, as anathema to the Capi-
talist groups i n p ower . Thus, the earliest forms in estern 
Europe began in Great Bri ta in and France~ Sir Thoma s More' s 
Utopia is a type of Social ism. 
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Thi s Utopian fo~n of Socia lism was displaced, during 
the mi ddle part of the nineteenth century by a new type, 
cal l ed "Scientific Socia lism." This l atter form, expounded 
by Karl Marx, became one of the most i mportant influences in 
the development of political thought, and the organizat ion of 
social relations. In recognition, therefore, of the contri-
bution of Marxism to the social studi e s, the discussion on 
Sociali sm will be based on its principles. 
Scientific socialism is distinguished from Utopian 
socialism by its approach, which is based on experi ence and 
h is t ory rather than on the moral i deals generated from t he 
principle that there is a spiritual life foi' man beyond the 
phy.s ical • . As a resul t it has also been cal l ed "Hi storical 
Materialism".l 
To fully treat the theory of Ivlarxis}'l'l is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. It woul d necessitate a separate thesis " 
in order to expand adequately the principl es involved. There-
f re , for the present purpose, some fundamental principles 
will be wi~ ee enrnnerated, followed by a synoptic interpre-
tation .. 
There are four main tenets which support the theory 
of Scientific Socialism: 
1. Social consciousnes s as the outcome of social 
existence is explained by materialism.2 In other words, the 
conditions of l ife determine t he methods of the production of 
goods, which combination, in turn, gives rise to ideas .. 3 
1. Lenin, TKM, 16 ; Burns, WIM, 15. 
2. Lenin, TKM, 15. 
3. Lenin, TKM, 16; Burns , WI M, 13. 
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2. Class struggle is inevitable.l Inasmuch as the 
me t hods of pro duction differ, society will be divided into 
classes (i.e., those who have the same means of production 
be long t o one group). Therefore , with the origin of idea s 
being contingent upon production, each class will have 
different ideas which will conflict. 
3. Commodity production is the law of economics.2 
Human needs are satisfied by the product on of com'11odities .. 
An exchange-val ue is p l aced upon these commodities by men 
ba rga n i ng with one another~ However, as the state becomes 
mo:ee c omplex, there is social division of labor. The simp l e 
pa ttern of exchange is abandoned , and the products of l a b or 
are sol d for money-value. Those who use money as the medium 
of exchange soon develop a surplus value, for the worker pro-
duc e s more than he is pai d for. With the surplus value, the 
b~ye r is able to- invest by disenfranchi sing others with less 
mon ey-value. This creates surplus labor time, that is, more 
lab or is available to the buye r w As surplus l abor increases, 
the p r oducts of labor increase disproportionate l y, whi le the 
mon ey-va lue for labor decreases. 
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4. The only solution lies in the " di c tatorship of 
the proletariat".3 Pressure f rom the uni ted action of workers 
1.. Lenin, TKM, 17; Burns, WIM, 9. 
2. Lenin , TKM, 18-20~ 
3. Lenin, TKM, 29 .. 
bring s about the socialization of the means of production 
with the resul ting condition that the products of labor are 
owned by society .. 
The basis of a socialist theory of the state is the 
c oncept that man is the product of environmental forces,. 
Hi s thoughts do not originate action, but are themse l ves the 
resul ts of man interacting physically with his environment.l 
The most important single factor in this interaction is the 
economic.2 Man's primary aim is to satisfy his physical 
needs . 3 In the process of securing ·these needs , he ente r s 
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a competitive fie l d (the struggle for surviva l of the fittest). 4 
He finds t hat to maintain a footing, he cam~ot l ive from day 
to day but must accumulate " goods " to insure his security. 
Thes e " g oods" become p rivate and are hi s " propert y".5 Pro-
pe r ty is now the symbol of his " fitness " t o survive. As the 
distributi on of goods become increasingly m1even, men separate 
int o c l asses---those who have , those who have l ess , and those 
who have none.6 The " those who have none" I•ea. lly have one 
1. Burns, WIM, 15-1 6 .. 
2. I ,enin, TK1\~' 18. 
3. Lenin, TKM , 18 ; Burns, wn:, 17. 
4. Burns, WIM, 15-16 . cf. Venabl e, Hl'DvW, 6 :3·. 
5. Burns, WIM, 17Q 
,. 
o. Lenin, TKM, 17 .. 
" g ood" and that is, themselves, in the fo rm of l abor value. 
In order to continue in the competition, they have onl y one 
course for action, which is to exchange their one commodity 
fo the " goods " of others. l It is here that the conflict 
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l i ~ s. If the exchange were carried on fairly, that i s, equal 
" goods for equal labor value, they would themse l ves eventu-
ally .begin an accumulation. But the exchange is one-sided 
and they remain in the same state of having nothing. 
The theorist of socialism, therefore, deduced that 
prlvate property was the greatest evi l in the history of social 
orders. Thus Ma r x and Engels say, in the Manifesto of the 
Communist Party (1848), that the distinguishing features of 
communism is not the abol i tion of property generally, but 
the aboli tion of bourgeois property.. They vwul d make the 
standard by which everything is mea sured, not property but 
labor.2 That whi ch would distinguish one man from another 
is h is capacity fo r production as determined by individual 
endowment. 
There are methods generally appli cable to most 
societi es which would correct the evi l of private ownership . 
1. Burns , WIM, 17 .. 
2. Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme (Oakeshott ed. 
SPDCE, 151-153) . 
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The following list is taken from the Manifesto of the Commun-
i st Party .. l 
1. The abolition of property in land, and the 
application of all rents of land to public purposes. 
2. A heavy progres sive income tax. 
3. The abolition of all rights of in~eritance. 
4. The confiscation of the property of a ll emi-
grants and rebels. 
5. The centraliza tion of credit i:n. the hands of 
the state by means of a national bank. 
6. The centra lization of means of comrau..tlication 
anu transport,. 
7. The extension of factories and instruments of 
production owned by the s ta te. 
8. The e qual obligation of all to work. 
9. Th e combination of a griculture with manufact-
uring industries. 
10. Free education for all children in public 
SC11001S • 
Th is presentation of the position of Socialism ha s 
limited the e vidence to the :tl~arxian v :'L e w becaus e that view 
is the onl y one t hat is more tha n a proposal for the correction 
of immediate ill s . It i s in addition , a philosophy of man 
1 . Marx and Engels, Manifesto in Lee (ed.),. EOM, 52, 53. 
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and his world. Ma rx had an eye not for the reform of any 
particular state but for a refo~n of the tota l social orde r~ 
Despite the denia ls o~present day Marxists, who pride them-
selves as the only reali sts in a world of men with their 
hea s in the clouds, Marx was a man with visions. The class-
les s society is an ideal. 
Marx's Manifesto is compa r able in kino to the 
Republic of Plat 0; the concretion of his philo s ophy in the 
Constitution of the USSR is in direct ratio with the Laws 
of Plato. There is the descent from the ideal state to the 
practical state in recognition of the limitation of man. 
Plato would criticize the Socialist state on its 
most vita l assumption. Man's real need is ~'lot the satis-
faction of his physical want s , but the atta inment of spirit-
ua l peace.l He would acknowledge that material wants must 
fi rst be satisfied before the pursuit of the life of reason 
can be achieved. This awareness was the motivation for his 
institut ion of the communal life for the Gua rdians. To 
mak e the end of the indiv idual the acquisiti on of material 
happiness , h owever , is to subordina t e Reason to the Appe tites. 
Such an ideal woul d remove the factors that raise man above 
the level of beasts. 
1. Rep., II. 358-367 ; IV. 444; IX. 587. 
Contrary al so to the sense of rightness in Plat o , 
is the location of the source of man 's goal in the sensible 
worlda The on ly true origin of ideals is the rea l m of Fonns 
with t h e Good as the guiding principle. 
Plato would be critical of the assumed theory 
whi ch underlies the princ i ple that man is by nature in com-
p e tition t o survive ~ Society, for Plato, originated not 
in competition, but in mutual aida He wou l d substitute 
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the phrase, " association for the survival of all" , for 
" struggl e in the survival of the fittes t ". Man in the natura l 
state is not evil but becomes evil in the unordered e xce sse s 
of the lQxurious state ~ 
Plato wou l d be critica l of the supremacy of the 
pioletariat. Ea ch individual has a s necific function to 
perfonn. To extend the r esp onsibili ty of g overnment to 
worl{ers is a violation of this pri nc iple. On l y a few are 
end owe d with the natural capaci ty t o lead byway of reason .. 
The rule of the prol etariat wou l d reduce the social order to 
t he confusi on of a chaotic "democracy " .. 
All is n ot ant ithesis between Plat o and Socia li sm . 
The " wi thering a way of the s tate" into a classless society 
is an ideal that would find favor, for then each citizen 'Ot.lld 
be free t og a i n under•st~nding by the deve l opment of h is mind~ 
As T ebe rle says it, "In the morning a ditch di gge:r· , in the 
e v e i n g , a critical phi losophe r " .l Articl e 122 of the Con-
sti t uti on of t he U~-:l SR is a.n echo of the posit ion of women in 
Pl a to ' s social order~ 
Vomen in t h e USSR are accorded equa l ri ghts 
with men i n a ll sphe res of economic, state, 
culture , social and political life~2 
The realizat i on of these r i ght s of women is e n sur ed 
by a ffoi'ding equally with men the r i ght to w ork ; f c(y-rnent for 
work , rest , so.ci a l ins uranc e and education , and by state 
pl·ot e ction of the interests of mothe r and c h i l d , pregnancy 
104 
l eave with pa y, ancJ. the provision of a wide network of mate r nity 
home s , nurseries and kind erga r tens. 3 
Th e one me e ting po i nt comrrJ,on t o Socialist and t h e 
Platoni s t is devotion to a n i dea l Zeal for the caus e i s re-
wa r ded lith honor~ The most earnest ci t izen of the Socialist 
o r de r is usual ly e lect ed t o leadership a The citizen of 
Pla t o s socia l order who is z ea lou s in pursuing the l ife of 
vi r tue is reve r e d as a ho l y ma n. 
5~ Plato a n d Catholicism 
At first g l ance, one may que st ion whethe r there 
can be a n y parallel between the social order advoca t e d by 
1 . Hebe r l e, SM, 79 . 
2* Constitution , 40 .. 
3. pon s t itution, 40~ 
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Pla to and the Roman Catholic Church. The comparison about 
to be discussed is striking in its points of contact. 
In the Catholic faith, the Church is said to be 
one , apostolic and catholic .. l It is one in that it is the 
reveale d and inspired organ of God's wi ll. It is catholic 
,.., 
i n that it is universal."' The Church, therefore, is the 
ea r t h l y order of the spiritual realm. Mankind, the many and 
the particular, achieve unity and universality in the 
brotherhood of worship.3 
Structurally, it is an hierarchy4 that imitates the 
heavenly organization. The Pope is at the top of the pyramid 
because his h oliness enables him to communicate with God, the 
h ead of the s piri tua l organization. Thus privi l eged, he 
h&s the wisdom inspired by thi s communion. His a ssistants 
are tbe Cardinals and Bishops who are also wise men in their 
holiness . The level of priests are the protectors of the 
Church, who by their knowledge of the precepts of the Church 
can council men in guiding their li ves virtuously. The wor-
shippers are the supporters of the Church. It is they who 
by their labor leave the holy Fa thers free to learn the will 
1. Ma lloy, CFI, 21. 
2. Ma lloy, CFI, 21. 
3. Enc. Brit., Vol. 19., 405. 
4. Enc. Brit., Vol. 19, 405-408. 
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of God. Whe re the order of monks and nuns and those who l ead 
t he seclude d life are incorporated in thi s hierarchy is a 
doubtfu l point. They are at once l ike all the members of 
the Church body. Perhaps it woul d be a fair sta t ement to 
say tha t they are singul ar and autonomous .l 
Th e a im o f every Catholic is to l ive the g ood life~2 
What c onst i tutes the g ood varies for each according to his 
funct i on. For some it is contempl at i on; for others it is 
teaching the word of God to the peopl e, and still yet for 
others it is by the doing of good works of charity and 
brothe r hood, and in the effici ent perf ormance of their regu-
lar dutiesa 3 
The Pope is the unchallenged l egislator and leader 
whose wo rd i s sancti f i ed in l aw. The worshippers accept the 
laws as truth . They do not presume to i nterpret , for they 
acknowledge that their unde rstanding :L s l im:tted in such 
matters. 4 
Plato ' s s oc i a l order is organizationa l ly such a 
stru cture. His divine Good is the inspiration of the laws of 
the philosopher-klng . The Laws constructs the mode l ci t y 
upon a religious foundationa 
1. Key of Heaven (Le l en ed .) 1 10 . 
2. Key of Heaven (Le l en ed.) , 11 1 18. 
3. Key of Heaven (Le l en ed. ) 1 11, 18. 
4. Key of Heaven (Le l and ed . ) , 20. 
1. Laws, I a 
2. Laws, x. 
3. Laws, x. 
4 . Laws , x. 
5. Laws, x. 
6. Ls.ws, x. 
Tell me, Stranger, is God or a man supposed 
bD be the au thor of your laws?l 
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Vfuat may be the true doctrine .~ y ou will here-
after discover, by the help of the le ~islator 
and others ••• for the duty of the legisla tor 
is and always will be to teach you the truth 
of these mattersa2 
One soul or more? More than one •• we must 
not suppose that there are les s t han two---
one t he author of good, and the other of 
evil.3 
The be s t soul takes care of the wor l d and 
guide s it along the good path .4 
The ruler of the universe has ordered all 
things with a view ~o the preservation and 
pe rfection of the ho le J and each part has 
an appointed state of acti on and passion; 
and the smallest action or fraction of any 
part affecting the minutest fraction has a 
presiding ministere And one of these parti-
sans of the universe is thine own .... wh ich , 
hoVlever little, has t he whole in view.5 
But the formation of qualities he left to 
the wil l s of individua l s.6 
624. 
888. 
896. 
897. 
903. 
904. 
No man shall have sacred rites in a private 
house.~.let him place his offer4ings in the 
hands of priests or p rieste sses.l · 
Not only is the _L_llws religious, but its religion 
has transcended the Greek culture of many gods to hint at 
a sole creator •. These passages, combined with t he story of 
creat ion in the T;lma~llS, are peculiarly Chr:i.stian. It 
lacks , however, the doctrines of salvation through grace. 
In its p lace, the will to virtue is prirnary~2 
We have disclose d the religious e lement i n Plato. 
Can the reve~se, that :i.s, the civil element be found in the 
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Roman Catholic Church? The fol lowing exceJ~pts from different 
Encyclicals provide the answer: 
Man 's natural instinct is to live in civil 
society for he cannot attain in solitude 
the necessar>y means of l ife, nor development 
of his mental and moral facu lties ; and therefore, 
by a divine provis ion, he is born for a 
domestic and civil union and association with 
men, by which alone the needs of life can be 
adequately supplied.3 
The S tat e must not absorb the indivi dual or 
the fami ly. 4 
Of its very nature the true aim of all social 
activity should be to help members of the 
social body, but never to destroy or absorb 
them .. 5 
1. Laws, X .. 909. 
2.. Laws, X. 904. 
3 .. Immortale Dei (1885 ) (Oakeshott ed . SPDCE, 45-46). 
4. Reru.l'!l Novarum (1891) (Oakeshott ed. SPDCE, 56) . 
5.. Quadrage simo Anno ( 1931) ( Oakeshott ed.. SPDCE, 58) .. 
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Man can judge of this contingency, as we say, 
onl y because he has a soul t ha t is simpl e, 
spiri tual , and intellectua l ••• kn owi ng t he 
unchangeab l e and necessary t•easons of what 
is true and go od, i t sees that no part icu lar 
k i nd of good is necessary to us$1 
The safety of the com.T!lonwealth is not only 
the first law, but it is a governor ' s who e 
reason of existence.2 
The rea l perfection of a ll creatures is 
f ound in the prosecution and atta inment 
of the ir respective ends ; but the supreme 
e nd ~o which human liberty must a spire is 
God.v 
The affini ty of the t wo a reas of theory canno t be 
disputede In fact, it wou l d seem p robabl e t hat P l a to mi ght 
be at home in the Roman Churche 
1. Libertas (1888 ) ( Oakeshott ed. SPDCE , 60). 
2 . Re rum Novarum ( 189 1 ) (Oakeshott ed. SPDCE, 56 ) .. 
3. Libe r t as {1888 ) ( Oakeshott ed. SPDCE, 63 ) . 
The purpose of t h is thesis is to find a coh~ rent 
theory of a wor k i n g s ocia l order as i mpli cit i n Plato 's 
phi losophy . "Socia l orde r " has b e e n de f lnE:d as the s yn-
thes i s of the activities of man in a g roup uni fi ed by a 
common purpose~ 
The s t u dy , c ent e ring a bout thre e dia l ogues, t h e 
Republ ic, the s tate sma n and the Laws, attempts to reach a 
definit'ion of the Platonic social order by study i n g its 
ori g ins, its f unc t ions , its st r u cture, and its purp ose . 
I t a l so se eks t o p~esent the re l ation of the Greek concept 
of are te to the change in societies from t he Homeric p e r iod 
to the t i me of Plato . 
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Correlated t o the s t u.dy is a comparis on of Pla to ' s 
soci a l order to some other the ori e s of s ocial organization . 
Chapter I deve l ops the con c e pt of are t e, which is 
defined as the aim o f the c u lture of a peop l e. T~e are te o f 
t h e Homeri c per·iod was n ob i li t y . It l eft its mark on t he 
ariv t ocr·a t i c s tructu.re of t he Pla tonic society . Duri n g the 
pe r i od of Hesiod, the are t e shifted to the ideal of justic e 
which reappeared as one of the principles for achjevin~ the 
bes t sta te in Pl a to' s Republic. With the dominance of the 
state , arete emphasiz e d patriot i sm a s the p r ope r aim of t be 
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peopl e. Plato was infl u enced by the disc i p l ined institut i ons 
which cha racterized the Spartan way of l ife. As the Sophist s 
of the fif th century became import ant in Greek society , 
arete again changed in content. Thi s time the ideal was the 
acq_u isition of educa tion as a means t o prominent pol itica l 
l ife . However , it was educat i on based on a the ory of rela-
t i v ism and individualism. Pl ato retained the emphasis on 
educa.t icn , but based his sys tem in an intelli gibl e principle 
of a lue that woul d point out the nature of man as a social 
ani m& l . 
Chapter II is ~n anal ysis of the social structure . 
It probes the possibility of s ocia l control b y p resenting 
two opp osite opinions on the subject. Peppe r , in the " The 
Con :l tions of Soci a l Control , " defends the po sitive side, 
with Popper, in the Open Socie t Land Its Enemies, taking the 
negative viewpoint. The att empt is made to prove that P l ato 
bel ieved in the va l idity of social control . There i s a brie f 
pres en ta tion of the psychological, epistemologica l , and meta-
physical principl es of Plat o which is used to show .that the 
Plat onic state had a basis in his philosop~y . 
The rol e of Vocation is determined by the theory 
that men as social animals are di f fere n tia ted fr om one another 
by the possession of unique and natural abi l ities. Through 
the recognition of the se innate differences, each t n d i vidua l 
woul d function in his_special p l ac e in the social order . 
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The institution of the fami ly is based on the prin-
ciple of unity. 'l'he communal life is advanced as the means 
to the attainment of this unity , for pr:tvate interests arising 
from private possessions are a danger to public interest. 
It is the responsibility of the s ta te to supervi s e the fami l y 
in or· ' er that adherence to this principle may be maintained. 
The State , therefore, regulates a l l the phases associated 
with marria ge---courtship, chi l dbearing , and relationship 
among the members of the fami l y. 
The role of education is to prepare the members 
for the virtuous life, which is the objective of the state~ 
This institution is a l so state controlled. From birth 
through adu lthood, each step in the education of the individ-
ual ls legislated. 
The place of art in the Platonic social order is 
a functional one. Art, defined as imitation and as play , is 
' 
an excellent means of indoctrination in the objectives ot 
the state.· Therefore, as a tool of education, art is strictly 
censored to insure the imitation of the proper obj e cts. 
Religion is ground for the organization of the 
state. God is the " measure of all things't.. Therefore, the 
concept of God is manifested in every phase of the social 
order. Human g oods have their basis in divine g oods. I t is 
the duty of the state to inst i 1 the fear of Gocl in its members 
through education . 
113 
The state e xists because the individual is unique6 
That is , men possess innate abi li t ies in varying degre e s for 
wide l y different occupati6ns. Therefore, men came into vo l -
untary association with one another through a mutua l exchang e 
of the values of their unique capacities. 
However, if the state is to conti nue to exist, 
there must be a principle other than differentiation---
unity . Unity is possible when the aim of leg isla tion is to 
produG e the g reatest possibl e happiness for the whol e society. 
The s ta te orders i ts institutions on the theory that possess-
ions should b e held in conmon or , if this is impossible, that 
p oss ess ions should b e e quitably distributed. Such l i mitati on 
on p r operty is t o prevent the c ohfl ict which arises when 
some citizens have mol~e ec onomic security than others. 
Cha.pter II I d efines the t he ory o:' Plato 1 s social 
organ i zati on. The socia l order i s the unity in the mul tl-
p l iclty of men in their several func tions. There is justice 
in t he order when each member finds his proper niche . There 
is v irtue, when the several members , so differentiated, are 
reunited in their adherence to the universal acceptance of 
the principl e that man ' s proper duty is to seek the d ivine. 
Also deve loped in thls chapter, :is a comparative 
study of Plat o's socia l order with other fo~1s of social 
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o rgani zation 8 The conc l usion i s that, despite the many 
points of contact in principl es and institutional structur es, 
Plato ' s proposed society is neither Utopian, Fascistic , 
nor Socia listi c~ There, may be good : reason, however, to 
consider the theory that Plato ' s socia l s ti•ucture is a 
reli r:; ious order. This suggesti.on arises f1•om the comparison 
with the Roman Ca tholic Church ~ 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to find a coherent 
theory of a working social order as imp icit in Plato's 
philosophy . "Social order" is to be defined as the syn-
thesis of the activities of man in a g r·oup unified by a 
comrno g oa 1. 'I'he study is centered a b out three dialoe;ue s, 
the Republic, the Statesman and the Laws . The study seeks 
to present the relation of the Gre ek concept of arete to 
the t hought of Plato. Corr·elated to the study is a com-
pari:wn of the Platonic social order to some other theories 
of social organization~ 
Arete which means the aim of the culture of a 
p eopl e is an important concept to the study of Plato ' s 
theory of social organ i zation. Tracing the deve lopment 
of this concept in the history of Gree ce from the Homeric 
period through to Plato, brings to light the influence of 
each ~hase of Greek culture on Platonic thought. The pre -
deces s ors of Plato l eft him the heritage of aristocracy , 
justice, discipline, and education. Plato added content 
and universa l ity with his emphasis upon the value of the 
integrated personality in an integrated society. Man as 
a member of a socia l group took precedence over man as an 
individualist .. 
Plato ' s concern wi th the importance of social 
organization shows an assumpti on that socia l contro l is 
va lid. The form of control t o be used is extensive and 
intensive education of the members of societ-y f r om birth 
througi1 adulthood. 'I'he prjnciple of persuasion is to '::-·e 
the instrument, for the rationa l factor in man must be 
recognized. TLe institutions within which control is to 
opera te are to be based on the principles of psychol ogy , 
e p ist e n\O l ogy , and metaphysics .. 
The psychol og ical principle s are 1) that man is 
rationa l, 2) tt1a t man is moral, 3) that man is a social 
animal, and 4) that man as an individual is unique. The 
societ y o rganized a round these principles is one that a llows 
each member· within it to fulfill his nature through the 
development e.nd use of his unique a bi li ties in a vocation 
suit e d to these particular abi li tie s; and is one that 
acknowledges the interdependence of lndivi~als, by order-
ing i t::~e lf in such a way as to . prevent the dominance of 
.. I 
any one group of its members t0 the hindrance of another. 
I 
I n suo a soci ety the happines$ of the group as a whole is 
I 
pri mary. I 
The epistemological t rinciples are 1) that true 
knowledge transcends the data ~ cquired through the sense s, 
I 
I 
I 
2 
I 
i 
! 
I 
I 
I 2) that the objects of know l edge / are rea l existents in a 
realm distinct from the sensory [sphere , 3) that the process 
of knowing i s a p rogressive one rnd must be carefully super-
vised if the prope r objects o f ~nowledge are to be known, 
. I 
4) tht:t the development of the l piritual l ife is a vi t al 
factor to the attainment of knowledge. A society based on 
I 
these principl es must establish j/ a sound system of education 
which rec ognizes that ethies is /necessary to perfect unity 
i n social activity~ 
I 
The metaphysical prin1i ple s are 1) that rea li ty 
I . ) is a uynthes is of iden tity and ~ifferentiation, 2 tha t 
I 
rea li ty is r ational, 3) that reality is moral, and 4) that 
reality lS perfect. The s ociety founded on these princ iples 
must seek t o incorporate the characteristics of rea l ity. 
The f unc tion of each insti t ution must be kept distinct but 
t:he totality of institu tions must f unc tion harmonious l y .. 
Vocati o , the fami l y, educat i on, art, religion and citizen-
ship a re many yet one. This society must ho l d as its 
foundat ion the reli g ious li f e in acknowledg ement of a 
supreffie rational principle which is the s ource and 
sustainer of al l unity. 
Pl ato ' s socia l structure is not an end in itself. 
It is the instrument through which the nature of rea lity is 
3 
ap _rehended. As the phenomenal representati on of the 
n umena l order, its purpose is to enable man to reali z e his 
t rue n a ture, which is spiritual. 
Compari s on with othe r theories of socia l organ-
ization brings out the universa l qua l ity of Plato's proposed 
social order. It i nc l udes many of the best points of Uto-
p ianism, Fascism, Socia lism and Catholicism within its 
s tructure, yet is distinct by its high atta inment of unity 
i n multipl icity. The law of r eason, the pri ncipl e of order, 
t he theory of the clas s l ess society and the acceptance of 
a creative principle that transcends man in his mortality , 
but is yet within him, are all contained in Plato ' s the ory 
of ·social organization. 
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